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Abstract
 
Throughout his fiction and nonfiction writings,
 
particularly in his narrative texts, D. H. Lawrence was
 
preoccupied with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy
 
with another while preserving individuality. Late in his
 
career, Lawrence developed these explorations into a theory
 
of the unconscious and union in two essays—Psychoanalysis
 
and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the Unconscious-—
 
claiming that the theory first evolved undeliberately from
 
his fiction and then was developed in the essays.
 
Traditionally, Lawrencian criticism has offered limited
 
examination of the essays, considering them as the primary
 
site of Lawrence's psychology theory and using them only to
 
explicate the fiction. Conversely, some contemporary
 
studies have isolated the essays, examining only their
 
rhetorical style and structure without considering how the
 
essays relate to the fiction. Reversing and expanding both
 
views, as well as disputing Lawrence's separation of the
 
essays from his fiction, this study instead Shows that
 
(1) the novel Women In Love was the narrative text in which
 
Lawrence began consciously and deliberately to develop his
 
psychology theory of the unconscious and union and
 
(2) Lawrence's tentative articulation of theory in the novel
 
developed into a more assertive and strategically developed
 
rhetoric of persuasion in the two essays.
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Introduction
 
D. H. Lawrence was a prolific writer whose works span
 
many genres, explore almost every conceivable topic, and
 
continue to generate an abundance of wide-ranging critical
 
responses. However, in spite of the profusion of inquiry
 
into both his narrative and expository texts, a survey of
 
Lawrence scholarship and criticism quickly reveals that
 
commentators have devoted their time and attention primarily
 
to Lawrence's fiction. They offer, usually, only a limited
 
examination of his nonfiction, exploiting it generally for
 
the purpose of explicating the fiction. The nonfiction, for
 
most critics, becomes a window into Lawrence's narratives.
 
A case in point are Lawrence's two psychology essays.
 
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of the
 
Unconscious:
 
[Critics] have been happy enough to pillage both
 
psychology books for resounding summaries of
 
Lawrence's ^beliefs' but, considering how much has
 
now been written on him, they have provided
 
comparatively little appraisal of their character or
 
worth and not much discussion of their relation to
 
his other writings. (Ellis 69) ,
 
The purpose of my study is twofold. First, I will
 
reverse this traditional approach by using Lawrence's
 
fiction to inform his nonfiction; specifically, I will show
 
that Lawrence's novel Women in Love was the text in which he
 
began to work out his psychology theories that later
 
appeared in the two psychology essays. Second, I will
 
dispute Lawrence's own claim, made in his foreword to
 
Fantasia, that his psychology theories evolved unconsciously
 
from his fiction.
 
Lawrence called the novel form "the one bright book of
 
life" and "art speech," the only true speech. He believed
 
that it was the task of the artist to develop this truth
 
through fiction, and that the sole purpose of the novel was
 
to convey^^ and effect change in its readers, not by
 
preaching, but by leading readers through a narrative
 
experience that would enlighten them. Jjowever, as
 
Lawrehce's narrative texts grew, so too did the didactic
 
assertions within his fiction, and by mid career, his
 
theories became more directly stated in his tales. A case
 
in point is his novel Women in Love, which explores the
 
conflicting goals of preserving individuality—which he
 
called "spontaneous being" or the fully realized
 
"unconscious"—while maintaining an ideal intimate
 
relationship with another—which he called "union," "star-

equilibrium," or "polarity."
 
Some four to five years after completing Women in Love,
 
Lawrence presented his theory of the unconscious and union
 
in fully developed expository form in his two psychology
 
essays, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious and Fantasia of
 
the Unconscious. Here too Lawrence's bias for the novel
 
surfaces in his foreword to Fantasia where he explains that
 
his theories are inferred from the novel.
 
This pseudo-philosophy of mine - ^pollyanalytics', as
 
one of my respected critics might say - is deduced
 
from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The
 
novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen.
 
And then the absolute need which one has for some
 
sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself
 
and things in general makes one try to abstract some
 
definite conclusions from one's experiences as a
 
writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure
 
passionate experience. These ^pollyanalytics' are
 
inferences made afterwards, from the experience.
 
And finally, it seems to me that even art is
 
utterly dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it,
 
on a metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may
 
not be anywhere very accurately stated and may be
 
quite unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a
 
metaphysic that governs men at the time, and is by
 
all men more or less comprehended, and lived. . . .
 
Then it is unfolded into life and art. {Fantasia,
 
"Foreword" 15)
 
Given Lawrence's "deducing" and "inferring," the
 
implication is that no direct claim has been made in his
 
fiction—hints maybe, or, to be very Lawrencian, knowledge
 
is gained from the whole experience of life in the novel.
 
Further, if the experience of the novel has come "unwatched
 
out of [Lawrence's] pen," the expectation is that he makes
 
no direct claims as novelist, as author of Women in Love,
 
and that his philosophy was quite unconsciously developed as
 
he was writing this novel. By heeding Lawrence's admonition
 
to trust the "tale" and not the "teller," and by examining
 
Women in Love's structure, its narration, and its dialogue,
 
this study will reveal many examples in which Lawrence was
 
consciously and deliberately articulating his theory of the
 
"unconscious" and "union" in this novel. Also analysis will
 
show Women in Love to he an earlier st^9® of Lawrence's
 
conceptualization process: throughout the novel's text are
 
examples of Lawrence's theory in embryonic form. Finally
 
the study will show the two psychology essays to be formal
 
expository statements fleshed out after, and probably as a
 
result of, the novel, which through its queries and answers
 
beGomes, in addition to a compelling fiction/ the
 
preliminary draft of Lawrence's psychology theory.
 
Ultimately both this novel and the psychology essays are
 
laden with Lawrence's gospel of the unconscious and union.
 
Background
 
Throughout his writing career, Lawrence was preoccupied
 
with the struggle between men and women attempting to
 
establish an intimate relationship but, at the same time,
 
struggling to preserve their individuality. In his novels
 
and short stories, Lawrence continually explored and
 
recorded the quest for an ideal relationship, resulting
 
mostly in failed relationships and occasionally in those
 
unions whose success is left open to debate. Even to the
 
beginning reader of Lawrence, his preoccupation with the
 
struggle in human relationships is yery evident and
 
compelling, particularly in his earlier writings where
 
Lawrence's powerful imagery allows readers to feel the
 
experience along with those characters engaged in the quest
 
for this ideal state.
 
By mid career, however, the voice of the author began
 
to intrude into his narratives, striving to find a solution
 
to the human dilemma of avoiding isolation while preserving
 
individuality. Through both his characters and his
 
narrators, Lawrence began to talk out his ideas about why
 
relationships failed and how they could succeed. He was
 
experimenting, exploring, and establishing his theory of
 
individuality and union. This significant turning point for
 
Lawrence takes place in his mid-career novel Women in Love
 
(WIL hereafter).^ In this novel, relationships are not just
 
experienced; they are discussed over and over again by the
 
narrator and by the characters. Most telling is Lawrence's
 
own recognition of his need to debate these issues in his
 
fiction. In his Foreword to WIL, which was written in 1919,
 
two years after the completion of the novel, but published
 
separately from both the English and the American
 
publications of the novel, he explains:
 
This novel pretends only to be a record of the
 
writer's own desires, aspirations, struggles; in a
 
word, a record of the profoundest experiences in the
 
self. Any man of real individuality tries to know
 
and to understand what is happening, even in himself,
 
as he goes along. This struggle for verbal
 
consciousness should not be left out in art. It is a
 
very great part of life. It is not superimposition
 
of a theory. It is the passionate struggle into
 
conscious being. (Phoenix II 275-276, emphasis
 
added)
 
Although the foreword was written some two years after
 
the novel, allowing Lawrence time to consider what he had
 
done and to identify his "struggle for verbal
 
consciousness,"he was, nevertheless/ aware of a change in
 
his writing much earlier on. In a letter to Edward Garnett
 
dated 12 December 1913, Lawrence discusses his new novel-in­
progress The Sisters (which later was split to become The
 
Rainbow and WIL), "It is very different from Sons and
 
Lovers: written in another language almost. . . . 1 shan't
 
write in the same manner as Sons and Lovers again, 1 think—
 
in that hard, violent style full of sensation and
 
presentation" (Sagar 46, Lawrence's emphasis). Then in May
 
of 1916 after beginning WIL, Lawrence referred to it as "a
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stranger to ine even as I write it" and "a sequel to The
 
RainJbow though quite unlike it" (Sagar 71). In that same
 
month, he seemed to be reiterating what he was to express
 
later in his 1919 Foreword to WIL: "I have got a long way
 
with my novel. . . . At present my real world is the world
 
of my inner soul, which reflects on to the novel I write"
 
(Sagar 71).
 
Besides Lawrence's own observations of the changes that 
were occurring in his writing from Sons and Lovers to The 
Rainbow and ultimately to WIL, the texts themselves offer 
substantial illustrations of these changes, particularly WIL 
which reveals a more self-conscious author and deliberate ■ ■ 
theorizer speaking through the narrator and the characters. 
Lawrence also developed a new plot structure for WIL.
 
Never before WIL, nor after, did Lawrence juxtapose two
 
couples and their ensuing relationships as he did in this
 
novel. Throughout, the reader is made aware of significant
 
differences between the couples, Ursula Brangwen/Rupert
 
Birkin and Gudrun Brangwen/Gerald Critch. One couple—
 
Ursula and Rupert—represents the potentially ideal
 
relationship, while the other couple represents a failed
 
relationship. Some critics argue that this interpretation
 
of Lawrence's couples as polar opposites is too simplistic a
 
notion and that WIL is too complex to be reduced to good
 
couple versus bad couple. Indeed WIL is complex in its
 
structure, its characterization, and its ideas;
 
nevertheless, the novel does focus on the two couples and
 
its plot does trace the evolution of the two relationships.
 
Furthermore, by novel's end, one couple is clearly lost:
 
Gerald and Gudrun remains directionless. At the
 
same time, however, while the success of Ursula and Rupert's
 
relationship has been argued, many critics consider the
 
novel's ending too open to be a pronouncement of a
 
successful union.
 
In spite of this lack of resolution for Ursula and
 
Birkin, the possibility of realizing Lawrence's ideal union
 
is embodied in their discussions, although lacking in their
 
experience. More important than the outcome of each
 
couple's relationship is consideration of what Lawrence did
 
with the two couples in the novel. By using opposing
 
couples in this way for the first time, Lawrence was
 
exploring the causes of success and failure in relationships
 
in an attempt to develop a theory of ideal union. He was
 
moving a step beyond observing and recording relationships
 
as experience in the way that he had already done in Sons
 
arid Lovers and The Rainbow. In WIL, he was beginning to
 
speculate and to theorize about how to achieve the ideal
 
relationship and how to avoid the destructive one, but he
 
did not resolve these issues by novel's end. This absence
 
of resolution is important. WIL as text is engaged in
 
exploration and speculation, not resolution. Lawrence did
 
hot realize his ideal union through Ursula and Birkin in his
 
fiction; he could only express it as theory through their
 
dialogue, through his narrator, and ultimately, in his later
 
psychology essays.
 
Talk is the essence of WIL. Beyond the couples' actual
 
experiences—what they did and how they did it—most
 
significant is their dialogue—especially the dialogue
 
between Ursula and Birkin as they struggle to define the
 
ideal union that they are both seeking. For Lawrence,
 
Ursula and Birkin's dialogue becomes the primary site of his
 
exploration, his "struggle for verbal consciousness."
 
Lawrence had never done this before. Never had his couples
 
self-consciously and intellectually sought an ideal
 
relationship, nor had a couple ever before engaged in
 
deliberate discussion of what it is they seek in their
 
union.
 
Both Sons and Lovers' and The Rainbow's couples
 
struggle with relationships, but they do not talk about it
 
in the same way (in fact they hardly talk about it amongst
 
themselves) nor is their goal the same. In both of these
 
novels the protagonists, Paul Morel in Sons and Lovers and
 
Ursula Brangwen in The Rainbow, seek a rite of passage, and
 
the relationships that they experience along the way end up
 
contributing to their coming of age. As a result, whatever
 
discussions they do engage, in regarding the relationships
 
come afterwards and seem to be more reflective, showing a
 
growing awareness of who they are and who they are becoming.
 
Ursula and Rupert/ on the other hand, talk throughout WIL
 
about their desires, and these discussions precede both
 
consuininatiori and inarriage. The dialogues from the earlier
 
novels pale in comparison to the garrulous conversations in
 
which WIL's Couples engage, particularly Ursula and Rupert.
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Chapter One
 
From Love Talk to Theory
 
The "Do you love me?" dialogue is a staple in
 
Lawrence's narratives, particularly in WIL, and for most
 
readers this dialogue would not be considered an uncommon
 
prelude to an intimate encounter, or following it for that
 
matter. However, Lawrence uses it for much more than
 
narrative unfolding^ The love dialogue between Birkin and
 
Ursula becomes a forum for Lawrence's evolving theory of
 
ideal union, a place where he works his ideas out through
 
the couple's questioning of one another and their debating
 
the issue of love. And as they talk, Birkin and Ursula
 
conceptualize together. Gudrun and Gerald's love dialogues,
 
on the other hand, are far less garrulous than Birkin and
 
Ursula's and far less theoretical as well. Gerald and
 
Gudrun usually have their talks after a physical encounter,
 
while Ursula and Birkin discuss love long before they have
 
had any kind of physical relationship.
 
Such stark differences between the couples can be
 
misleading and can tempt readers to judge these couples as
 
either successes or failures. While there is no doubt that
 
Gerald and Gudrun's relationship fails in the novel, Ursula
 
and Birkin's is open to debate, and critics have continually
 
argued the success of Ursula and Birkin's relationship. One
 
can make a case for either view. However, the purpose of my
 
m
 
study is not to judge the success or failure of the
 
relationships themselves, but rather to demonstrate that
 
Laurence was working out his theory through these couples
 
and their dialogue. Ultimately his novel culminates in
 
paradox rather than resolution.
 
My analysis is not directed to the novel as a resolved
 
entity in itself, but as one stage in Lawrence's development
 
of a theory that finally found its expression in the essays.
 
Although Gudrun and Gerald's relationship is more clearly a
 
failure than Ursula and Birkin's relationship, the latter
 
couple's relationship does not lead to the ideal theory of
 
union that Lawrence articulates in the essays. However,
 
their dialogues do mark the initial steps leading to this
 
ideal theory.
 
By the time Ursula and Birkin have their first
 
discussion in "An Island" chapter, it is clear that they
 
have more than a casual interest in one another, but there
 
have been no physical demonstrations of affection between
 
them. Their opening exchange is indicative of a search for
 
something more, a desire to find meaning in their lives.
 
Birkin's initial response to Ursula's inquiry about his
 
health demonstrates this search: "one is ill because one
 
doesn't live properly—can't. It's failure to live that
 
makes one ill, and humiliates one." Ursula responds
 
immediately with a question, "But do you fail to live?" A
 
few lines later Birkin explains, "But it infuriates me that
 
12
 
I can't get right, at the really growing part of me. . . . I
 
don't know what really to do. One must do something
 
somewhere," to which Ursula retorts, "Why should you always
 
be doing? . . . It is so plebian. I think it is much better
 
to be really patriGian, and to do nothing but just be
 
oneself, like a walking flower" (125, Lawrence's emphases)i
 
This early exchange sets the pattern for Ursula's role
 
as interlocutor in these dialogues, which some critics claim
 
is Lawrence's way of interrogating his novel and its
 
message. Jackson and Jackson define this role played by
 
Lawrence's female characters as "a counterpoint, a
 
corrective view"(34), and Cowan calls it "a practical and
 
realistic view that functions as a corrective" (171-172).
 
However, Ursula's role is not only to balance Birkin; she
 
tog is searching: "Ursula often wondered what else she
 
waited for. . . ^ Sometimes she had periods of tight horror,
 
when it seemed to her that her life would pass away, and be
 
gone, without having been more than this" (52).
 
From these personal concerns the dialogue quickly turns
 
to the topic of love, but it is the global implications of
 
love with which Birkin is concerned: "And they say that
 
love is the greatest thing . . . the foul liars. . . . the
 
millions of people who repeat every minute that love is the
 
greatest, and charity is the greatest—and see what they are
 
doing all the time" (126-127). Ursula, the spokesperson for
 
love, counters: "But . . . that doesn't alter the fact that
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love is the greatest, does it? What they do doesn't alter
 
the truth of what they say, does it?" (127, Lawrence's
 
emphasis). Ursula's tag questions form another pattern in
 
her dialogues with Birkin. "Frequently Ursula will provide
 
a succint rejoinder to his verbal outburst, a teasing and
 
deflating remark by her which reveals his characteristic
 
wordiness and imprecision" (Balbert 88). As she counters
 
with her view, she is inviting him to continue the dialectic
 
and to explain himself further.
 
The discussion continues taking only two pages for
 
Ursula to steer it to a more immediate level: "But . . .
 
you believe in individual love even if you don't believe in
 
loving humanity-?" (129). Birkin's response is not so
 
strange; he believes that love is just an emotion, not the
 
end-all and be-all of human relationships. Neither is
 
Ursula's an unusual view; she believes that the emotion of
 
love is the essential bond in a relationship. To this point
 
the discussion is a credible exchange between two thoughtful
 
people with opposite views, but it is neither esoteric nor
 
didactic. Birkin is looking for new direction; he wants
 
something more, but just what, he's not sure.
 
*One must throw everything away, everything—let
 
everything go, to get the one last thing one wants,'
 
he said.
 
^What thing?' she asked in challenge.
 
^I don't know—freedom together,' he said.
 
She had wanted him to say ^love.' (132)
 
Birkin's "I don't know" is explored throughout the
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novel as he and Ursula talk, attempting to develop a notion
 
of love, of relationships, of individual personal
 
development. Birkin's "freedom together" is the core of
 
Lawrence's ideal union, later to be called "star
 
equilibriiim" by Birkin in the novel and finally by Lawrence
 
in the essays. Ursula's view of personal engagement through
 
love is contrary not only to Birkin's "freedom together,"
 
but also to Lawrence's theory of impersonal union in the
 
essays, especially as it is expressed in Fantasia: "[Every]
 
individual creature shall come to its own particular and
 
individual fullness of being. . . . through a living dynamic
 
relation to other creatures. . . . not the relation of love
 
(182, Lawrence's emphasis).
 
Contrasting the some ten pages that comprise Ursula and
 
Birkin's first love discussion in "An Island" chapter is
 
Gerald and Gudrun's first love talk of less than a page,
 
which is far more concrete and immediate. Following
 
Gudrun's frenzied dancing and taunting of the bulls, she
 
defies Gerald's attempt to stop her. They argue; she
 
strikes him on the face. "You have struck the first blow,"
 
he exclaims. "And I shall strike the last," she retorts
 
(171).^ Following this terse exchange and Gudrun's pleas
 
that Gerald not be angry, the first mention of love between
 
them occurs, rather a sudden juxtaposition to such a brutal
 
dialogue: "I'm not angry with you. I'm in love with you"
 
(171).
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This open declaration of love is the first mention of
 
the word between these two; there have been no lencfthy
 
abstract discussions like Ursula and Birkin's preceding
 
Gerald's statement. Not only has Gerald and Gudrun•s first
 
physical encounter been a violent one, but it has also
 
served, ironically, as an introduction to Gerald's
 
declaration of love. Even more telling is GudrUn's
 
facetious reply (or is it disbelief?): "That's one way of
 
putting it." Next he checks with her, "It's all right,
 
then, is it?" and she acknowledges with "Yes, it's all
 
right" (172). Their first love talk extends four bridf
 
lines ^^hardly a discussion, and a far cry from the breadth
 
of inguiry that marks Birkin and Ursula's first verbal
 
encounter on love.
 
on the one hand, thrdugh Biirkin and Ursula's dialogue,
 
Lawrence demgnstrates a search for some kind of truth
 
through love, for some kind of Salvation through love--a way
 
to succeed in the quest for an ideaT relationship. On the
 
other hand, through Gerald and Gudrun's limited dialogue,
 
Lawrence is demonstrating failure to achieve this kind of a
 
perfected relationship by their lack of inquiry, by their
 
moving ahead without thinking, without examining each other,
 
without conceptualizing, without debating.
 
In Lawrence's extremes there is paradox. Ursula and
 
Birkin work so hard to formulate a theory that their mental
 
efforts inhibit physical and emotional union for quite some
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 time. While Gudrun and Gerald forge directly into physical
 
union, they act without giving any thought to what it is
 
they are doing with each other. One couple is too submerged
 
in theorizing their potential union; the other literally
 
doesn't know what they're doing.
 
Furthermore, the paradox is extended in the essays
 
where Lawrence bids readers to abandon the mental realm by
 
submitting to their preverbal unconscious and to impersonal
 
union, yet, he appeals to the reader^s intellect, giving
 
verbal directives on how to achieve this ideal state. In
 
his fiction these two opposing psychological states are
 
irreconcilable. Instead, each of WIL's couples represents
 
only one side of Lawrence's theoretical view—either Gudrun
 
and Gerald's primal approach or Ursula and Birkin's mental
 
analyzing—but neither can embody his theory in full nor can
 
they find balance between these two extremes, a balance
 
necessary to achieving Lawrence's ideal union.
 
Although these initial love dialogues reveal much about
 
how each of the two couples approaches their relationship,
 
it is in the "Mino" chapter that Birkin and Ursula's
 
dialogue begins to formulate Lawrence's theory of human
 
relationships. The"Death and Love" chapter, conversely,
 
via Gudrun and Gerald's "Do you love me?" dialogue, serves
 
as the counterpart to the "Mino" chapter showing this
 
couple's impending demise. Each couple's encounter follows
 
different patterns. For Ursula and Birkin"Mino" begins
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with dialogue and ends with embrace. For Gudrun and Gerald
 
"Death and Love" begiris with an embrace, followed by
 
dialogue and ultimately by consummation. Each couple's
 
immediate need is different. One must talk and talk before
 
acting; the other must do without talk. "The two relations,
 
Gerald-Gudrun and Birkin-Ursula, intertwine throughout the
 
book but represent wholly opposed experiences. If the
 
latter is a dream of becoming, the former dramatizes coming
 
apart" (Moynahan 67). Moynahan's "dream of becoming"
 
signifies potential-—not resolution—a potential theory that
 
Lawrence gives shape to in the essays, but never fully
 
realizes in WIL.
 
By the second page of the "Mino" chapter after some
 
preliminary small talk, Birkin gets right to the point: "if
 
we are going to know each other, we must pledge ourselves
 
forever. If we are going to make a relationship, even of
 
friendship, there must be something final and infallible
 
about it," and in response to Ursula's lack of response, he
 
continues: "I can't say it is love I haye to offer—and it
 
isn't love I want. It is something much more impersonal and
 
harder,—and rarer" (145) From this point a lengthy verbal
 
interaction ensues: a series of questions by Ursula and
 
assertions by Birkin.
 
'You mean you don't love me?' [Ursula]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'Yes, if you like to put it like that.—Though
 
perhaps that isn't true. I don't know. At any rate,
 
I don't feel the emotion of love for you—no, and I
 
don't want to. Because it gives out in the last
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issues.' [Birkin]
 
'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula;
 
narration omitted]
 
'Yes, it does. At the very last, one is alone,
 
beyond the influence of love. There is a real
 
impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any
 
emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we
 
want to delude ourselves that love is the root. It
 
isn't. It is only the branches. The root is beyond
 
love, a naked kind of isolation, an isolated me, that
 
does not meet and mingle, and never can.' [Birkin]
 
[narration omitted]
LiiaxidUJ-Uii uillxuLfciUJ
 
'And 't 1 • tttt-ru T a•
' you mean you can' love?' [Urs l ;  
narrati nn omi i
o tted]
 
'Yes if you like—I have loved. But there
 
beyond where there is no love.' [Birkin]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'But how do you know—if you have never really
 
loved?' [Ursula]
 
'It is true, what I say: there is a beyond, in
 
you, in me, which is further than love, beyond the
 
scope, as stars are beyond the scope of vision, some
 
of them.• [Birkin]
 
'Then there is no love,' [Ursula]
 
'Ultimately, no, there is something else. But,
 
ultimately, there is no love.• [Birkin]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'Then let me go home'—-what am I doing here?'
 
[Ursula]
 
'There is the door > . . You are a free agent.•
 
[Birkin]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'If there is no love, what is there?• [Ursula;
 
narration omitted] •
 
'Something,' [Birkin; narration omitted]
 
'What?' [Ursula]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'There is,' he said, in a voice of pure
 
abstraction, 'a final me which is stark and
 
impersonal and beyond responsibility. So there is a
 
final you. And it is there I would want to meet you­
-not in the emotional, loving plane—but there
 
beyond, where there is no speech and no terms of
 
agreement. There we are two stark, unknown beings,
 
two utterly strange creatures, I would want to
 
approach you, and you me. - And there could be no
 
obligation, because there is no standard for action
 
there, because no understanding has been reaped from
 
that plane. It is quite inhuman,—so there can be nc
 
calling to book, in any form whatsoever— because one
 
is outside the pale of all that is accepted, and
 
nothing known applies. One can only follow the
 
impulse, taking that which lies in front, and
 
responsible for nothing, asked for nothing, giving
 
nothing, only each taking according to the primal
 
desire.' (145-146, Lawrence's emphases)
 
There is nothing in this exchange to startle readers.
 
Birkin is insisting on a particular kind of relationship,
 
although he is not completely clear on how to achieve this,
 
while Ursula wants Birkin simply to declare his love to her.
 
Indeed Birkin's assertions are rather lofty and impersonal
 
as a prelude to intimacy, and it is unclear to the reader as
 
well as to Birkin what exactly it is that he wants.
 
"Something," his one—word response to Ursula's questioning
 
about what should replace love, and his long speech that
 
follows both demonstrate his attempt to articulate his
 
vision. Although this early recital has not yet reached the
 
theoretical stage that the psychology essays will later
 
take, it exemplifies Lawrence's "struggle for verbal
 
consciousness" in the novel, and it serves as a prelude to
 
Lawrence's discussion of love found in Fantasia:
 
It is time to drop the word love, and more than time
 
to drop the ideal of love. Every frenzied individual
 
is told to find fulfilment in love. So he tries.
 
Whereas, there is no fulfilment in love. Half of our
 
fulfilment comes through love, through strong,
 
sensual love. But the central fulfilment for a man
 
[or a woman] is that [each] possesses his own soul in
 
strength within him, deep and alone. The deep, rich
 
aloneness, reached and perfected through love and the
 
passing beyond any further quest of love. (123,
 
Lawrence's emphasis)
 
Love is a spontaneous thing, coming out of the
 
spontaneous effectual soul. As a deliberate
 
principle it is an unmitigated evil. (79)
 
[Every] individual creature shall come to its own
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 particular and individual fullness of being. . . .
 
through a liying dynhniic relation to other
 
creatures. . . . not the relation of love. (182,
 
Lawrence's emphasis)
 
Lawrence's discourse in the essays is further developed
 
than Birkin's words to Ursula. Birkih does not want to lose
 
himself in a love relationship in his encounter with Ursula,
 
and it is this fear that underlies his aigument, din thd
 
essays, however, Lawrence clearly identifies the darigers of
 
this kind of encompassing love and adamantly denounces its
 
practice. Lawrence's ideas begin to take shape through
 
these verbal explorations that Birkin takes with Ursula.
 
The following stage of Ursula and Birkin's lengthy
 
dialogue reveals a pattern of equivocation by Birkin as
 
Ursula insists on his declaration of love and an explanation
 
for his position of non-love. Like Lawrence, Birkin's
 
rhetoric is strong and affirmative when he is asserting
 
without interruption his beliefs, but he is not so
 
comfortable when called upon to explain his claims or to
 
enter into a dialogue. The following rhetorical hedging
 
resembles a rhetorical pattern in parts of Fantasia where
 
Lawrence is called to defend his first treatise.
 
Psychoanalysis (discussed in ch. 3 below, pp. 76-77 and
 
endnote 13).
 
4 ^But it is because you love me, that you want
 
me?' [Ursula]
 
'No it isn't. It is because I believe in you—
 
if I do believe in you.' [Birkin]
 
'Aren't you sure?' [Ursula]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'Yes, I must believe in you, or else I shouldn't
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be here saying this,' he replied. "But that is all
 
the proof I have. I don't feel any very strong
 
belief at this particular moment.' (147, Lawrence's
 
emphasis)
 
Birkin's "if I do believe in you" and his "I must
 
believe in you" reveal his discomfort when Ursula insists
 
that he prove himself to her. He is comfortable when
 
discussing his ideas as general theory, but not so
 
comfortable when asked to apply these views specifically to
 
himself and to their relationship. Birkin's fear of
 
personal and emotional connection with another often limits
 
him to the solitariness of his own thoughts, thoughts which,
 
according to Miko, serve paradoxically as "both doctrinal
 
revelation" and "a mask for his own inadequacy" (247-248).
 
The defensive posture, the hedging, and the biting voice
 
that sometimes emerge in Birkin's responses to Ursula's
 
challenges parallel Lawrence's rhetorical responses in
 
Fantasia to critics' indictment of Psychoanalysis, his first
 
essay. Both Birkin and Lawrence struggle to find words that
 
fit the idealism they espouse, and they both hide behind
 
words to cover their discomfort and uncertainty.
 
Next when asked by Ursula, "But don't you think me
 
good-looking?", he evades answering her question directly by
 
claiming, "I don't feel that you're good looking." He is
 
playing with words: She wishes to know if he perceives her
 
to be physically attractive, and he hedges by changing
 
Ursula's "think" to "feel." And when she pushes him by
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 asking "Not even attractive?", he still cannot give a
 
straightforward answer, but instead responds with a tirade
 
on the topic of physical attraction: "Don't you see that
 
it's not a guestion of visual appreciation in the least?
 
. . . I don't want to see you. I've seen plenty of women,
 
I'm sick and weary of seeing them. I want a woman I don't
 
see" (147, Lawrence's emphasis). In such examples, Birkin's
 
words create "an irony that even approaches humor" (Miko
 
248): Birkin begins by questioning Ursula's ability to
 
understand, "Don't you see," and ends with an indictment
 
against himself, "I don't see." A few lines later he
 
continues:
 
I want to find you, where you don't know your
 
own existence, the you that your common self denies
 
utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I
 
don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want
 
your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are
 
all bagatelles to me. (147)
 
Birkin's hedging, his self-righteousness, and most of
 
all, his long-winded rhetoric become tiresome to Ursula: "I
 
think you are very silly. I think you want to tell me you
 
love me, and you go all this way round to do it" (148).
 
However, Ursula's interrogation of Birkin does not always
 
function as the "corrective view" that Jackson and Jackson
 
and other critics have claimed. Sometimes she is
 
manipulating and pushing Birkin towards her view of love.
 
Indeed Widmer's speculation that Birkin's "wilful arguing of
 
the doctrine" develops into what he calls an "adversarial
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eroticism" (137) between these two is particularly
 
noteworthy here. Throughout the novel talk predominates,
 
and these dialogue scenes are especially indicative of
 
Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness" operating in
 
and through this couple, especially through Birkin. "In
 
Women in Love the stage is often left to Birkin to ^try to
 
know and understand' this *passionate struggle', [sic] and
 
his accompanying ^struggle for verbal consciousness' is
 
necessarily . . . often contradictory, evasive, and inexact"
 
(Balbert 88).
 
Other characters besides Ursula criticize Birkin for
 
his verbose, didactic posturing with such epithets as "word
 
bag" and "preacher." Both Birkin's evasion and his
 
inflated rhetoric parallel the Lawrence voice that we hear
 
in his psychology works, particulary in Fanatasia when
 
Lawrence is defending his first essay. Psychoanalysis,
 
against the critics. Lawrence was aware of his own problem
 
of garrulousness and alluded to it repeatedly: In a letter
 
to Edward Garnett (18 February I9I3), Lawrence expresses his
 
dismay, "I wish, I were not so profuse - or prolix," and
 
earlier he writes, "[Trim] and garnish my stuff I cannot ­
it must go" (Sagar 32 & 35). Perhaps Lawrence is parodying
 
his own verbosity through Birkin and others.
 
In spite of his overblown rhetoric and his
 
defensiveness, Birkin's "I want to find you, where you don't
 
know your own existence, the you that your common self
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denies utterly" (see above p. 23) is most significant as it
 
provides the kernel for Lawrence's preverbal pristine
 
unconscious later defined in the psychology essays. In
 
Psychoanalysis, Lawrence develops Birkin's idea to the full:
 
We have actually to go back to our own unconscious.
 
But not to the unconscious which is the inverted
 
reflection of our ideal consciousness [a mental
 
construct]. We must discover, if we can, the true
 
unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior
 
to any mentality. . . . innocent of any mental
 
alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine,
 
not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin
 
from which it behooves us to live.
 
It is not a shadow cast from the mind. It is the
 
spontaneous life-motive in every organism. (212)
 
And in Fantasia, Lawrence continues to explore the
 
implications of his unconscious theory as it pertains to
 
relationships:
 
It is the death of all life to force a pure idea into
 
practice. Life must be lived from the deep, self-

responsible spontaneous centres of every indiyidh^^
 
in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation
 
between individuals. The passions or desires which
 
are thought-born are deadly. (85, Lawrence's
 
emphasis)
 
Although Birkin's explanation to Ursula is not as
 
informed as Lawrence's, he begins his exploration of the
 
unconscious and union when he rejects Ursula's "good looks,"
 
her "womanly feelings," her "thoughts," opinions," "ideas"—
 
what Lawrence calls "egoism" or mental consciousness in the
 
essays. And Birkin embraces Lawrence's "pristine
 
unconscious" as the pathway to union with Ursula. Yet, at
 
the same time, he denies Ursula the very selfhood that
 
Lawrence's "pristine unconscious" promises, when he rejects
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her thoughts/ opinions, ideas, feelings. Both Birkin's
 
limited articulation of these concepts and the contradiction
 
inherent in his responses to Ursula exemplify Lawrence's
 
"struggle for verbal consciousness" in the novel. Indeed
 
there is irony and paradox in the couple's exchange when
 
considering it in the light of Lawrence's theory of
 
preserving one's "pristine unconscious" in "a vital non-

ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals"
 
{Fantasia 85).
 
In concluding this dialogue, Birkin is able finally to
 
get to the point and tell Ursula what he wishes their
 
relationship to be: "What I want is a strange conjunction
 
with you . . . not meeting and mingling;—you are guite
 
right:—but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two single
 
beings:—as the stars balance each other (148, emphasis
 
added). This is the first direct statement in the novel
 
that approximates Lawrence's theory of union as it was to be
 
expressed later in the two psychology essays. In
 
Psychoanalysis Lawrence explains:
 
For the end, the goal, is the perfecting of each
 
single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot
 
take place without a perfected harmony between the
 
beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last
 
clarified singleness of each being, a singleness
 
equilibrized, polarized in one by the counter-posing
 
singleness of the other.
 
The one process, of unison, cannot go on without the
 
other process, of purified severance. (222, emphasis
 
added)
 
Ultimately the star-equilibrium concept is the crux of
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's vision and Lawrence's own theory of the unconscious
 
and union as expressed in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia. By
 
the end of this dialogue, Birkin clearly and succinctly
 
suminarizes this theory: "[It] is the law of creation. One
 
is cpnunitted. One must conunit oneself to a conjunction with
 
the other——forever. But it is not selfless—it is a
 
maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity—
 
like a star balanced with another star" (152). And in his
 
psychology essays, Lawrence elaborates on Birkin's
 
"maintaining of the self in mystic balance and integrity":
 
There is as well the continuing widening gap. A
 
wonderful rich communion, and at the same time a
 
continually increasing cleavage. If only we could
 
realize that all through life these are the two
 
synchronizing activities of love, of creativity.
 
(Psychoanalysis 221-222)
 
There are two ways of love, two ways of activity in
 
independence. And there needs some sott of
 
equilibrium between the two modes. (Fantasia 46)
 
[The] whole circuit is established between two
 
individuals . . . neither is a free thing-unto-itself
 
. . . the very fact of established polarity between
 
the two maintains that coirespondence between the
 
individual entity and the external universe which is
 
the clue to all growth and development.
 
(Psychoanalysis 227)
 
By this point in the dialogue, even a novice or casual
 
reader of Lawrence would begin to find Birkin's
 
pronouncements esoteric and intrusive to the novel's world
 
of everyday experience. Even though some readers would not
 
necessarily make the connection to his essays, they would
 
fully recognize the novel's vacillation from theory to
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 experience:
 
What Lawrence's characters think and say about
 
themselves and their fate remains . . . the very
 
stuff of narrative, not of exposition. Nevertheless,
 
an examination of the language in which their
 
: obseryations are phrased will at once reveal, their
 
remarks are at the same time calculated theoretical
 
and formal statements. (Friedman 44)
 
His characters, specifically in this case, Rupert
 
Birkin, cannot resist the temptation to preach and to move
 
beyond experience. Clearly Birkin is wearing two hats: he
 
is the man pursuing Ursula as well as the spokesman
 
advocating Lawrence's theories. "[He] is the Lawrence-

fi&ure, that is to say, the author embodied in his own work,
 
but objectively embodied and integral to the work and not a
 
mere mouthpiece" (Spilka 121).
 
This is certainly not the case with Gerald, or with
 
Gerald and Gudrun as a couple. They are not interested in
 
lofty, probing discussions about what it is that they are
 
doing; they are not interested in examining themselves as
 
individuals or as ^  couple in the way that Ursula and Birkin
 
are driven to do. Their rather brief dialogue—one page in
 
"Death and Love" versus Ursula and Birkin's several pages.in
 
"Mino"—reflects their lack of awareness.
 
To Gudrun's "Are you happier?", Gerald responds, "Much
 
better. . .and I was rather far gone [from his father's
 
death]." Ursula continues, "I'm so glad if I help you," and
 
Gerald, "Yes. . . There's nobody else could do it, if you
 
wouldn't." One more brief comment by Gudrun, and then the
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key question, "But how much do you care for me?" Gerald
 
retorts "How much!. . .1 don't know either - but
 
everything," and Ursula, "But I can't believe it" (329,
 
Lawrence's emphases). There is no common ground here for
 
discussion; they are unable to find a mutual issue like
 
Ursula and Birkin's love on which to debate. The word
 
"love" does not enter this discussion. Gerald's further
 
reply conveys their preoccupation with the here and now,
 
with the concrete needs that make up this relationship.
 
Why don't you believe it?—It's true. It is
 
true, as we stand at this moment . . . I care for
 
nothing on earth, or in heaven, outside this spot
 
where we are. And it isn't my own presence I care
 
about, it is all yours. I'd sell my soul a hundred
 
times—but I couldn't bear not to have you here. I
 
couldn't bear to be alone. My brain would burst. It
 
is true. (330)
 
Gerald's dependence and Ursula's skepticism are again
 
displayed in their next dialogue in this same chapter when
 
Gerald sneaks into her bedroom seeking relief from his pain.
 
In less than two pages, Gudrun asks the same question four
 
times: "Why have you come?"; "And what do you want of me";
 
"What do you want of me?"; "But why did you come to me?"
 
Gerald, in response to her, explains: "I wanted to"; "I
 
came—because I must"; and finally, "Because—it has to be
 
so.—If there weren't you in the world, then I shouldn't be
 
in the world, either" (343, Lawrence's emphasis). Following
 
this exchange, the relationship is consummated. No more
 
words are exchanged other than Gudrun's repeated insistence
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that Gerald "must go" (347) before her family rises in the
 
morning. Their departure consists of an abrupt "Good-bye
 
then" from Gerald; a reciprocal "Good-bye" from Gudrun; arid
 
the narrator's accompanying description, "He kissed her,
 
dutifully, and turned away" (348-349).
 
Gerald and Gudrun's dialogues do not reflect the
 
conceptual exchange that Ursula and Birkin's dialogues do.
 
Instead of exchange, Gerald and Gudrun are "in opposition"
 
(WIL 177 & 329) as they speak. Gudrunts skepticism cancels
 
any hope of union between them, and Gerald's need for Gudrun
 
to fill his inner void cancels any possibility for their
 
realizing the individuality that "star equilibrium"
 
promises. The dependence that Gerald expresses in these
 
dialogues is extended into their ensuing consummation where
 
his needs not only consume Gudrun but also relfect his lack
 
of selfhood. They cannot function as "two single beings" in
 
"a strange conjunction"^ (WIL 148). Instead they experience
 
a fusion that denies selfhood, as their ensuing consummation
 
corroborates the problems that their dialogues have shown
 
(to be discussed in the next chapter below).
 
Not only has the word "love" not been used by Gerald
 
and Gudrun in "Death and Love" where they consummate the
 
relationship, but the topic of love is not broached by them
 
until the novel's end in "Snowed Up" long after the
 
relationship has been consummated. By then, the tone is
 
cynical and the dialogue destructive. Gudrun opens the
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 discussion abruptly with a and Geraid returns with
 
another question—a pattern that continues.
 
'How rauch do you love me?' [Gudrun]
 
[narration omitted]
 
'How much do you think I do?' he asked.
 
'I don't know,' she replied.
 
'But what is your opinion?' he asked.
 
[narration omitted]
 
'Very little indeed,' she said . . .
 
'Why don't I love you?' he asked. . .
 
V*! don't know why you don't—-I've been good: to
 
you. You were in a fearful state when you came to
 
me.'
 
[narration omitted]
 
, 'When was I in a fearful state?' he asked.
 
'When you first came to me. I had to take pity
 
on you.—But it was never love.'
 
[narration omitted]
 
'Why must you repeat it so often, that there is
 
no love?' he said . . . (442, Lawrence's emphasis)
 
After this initial fencing, Gudrun gets down to the
 
business of whether Gerald actually loves her. Four times
 
in a very brief space of text (not quite a third of a page)
 
she repeats the question: "Well you don't think you love,
 
do you?" (note the missing "me"); "You don't think you can
 
love me, do you?"; "You know you never have loved me, don't
 
you?"; "You know all right that you have never loved me.
 
Have you, do you think?" (442, Lawrence's emphases). Once
 
Gerald evades the question by debating the semantics of
 
love, but twice he gives her a solemn, one-word
 
pronouncement of "No" (442). The next question erases hope:
 
"And you never will love me . . . Will you?" Again Gerald
 
says "No" (442, Lawrence's emphasis).
 
From accusation and despair, Gudrun moves to her pleas
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 of "Say you loye me . . . Say you will love me for ever
 
—won't you—won't you?" and "Won't you say you'll love me
 
always? . . . Say it, even if it isn't true—say it Gerald,
 
do" (443). After Gerald concedes with "I will love you
 
always," Gudrun retaliates with "Fancy your actually having
 
said it" and "Try to love me a little more, and to want me a
 
little less" (443).
 
The single most important dialogue between them
 
ironically repeats the many arguments over love that
 
precede Birkin and Ursula's marriage. For Gerald and
 
Gudrun, however, it is a retrospective look back at
 
at what has been wanting, a dialogue held too late
 
and almost forced out of its two victims. . . .
 
. . . it is the ultimate failure of verbal
 
consciousness, where language is simply a deliberate
 
act of will, an act of aggression . . . (Ragussis
 
215)
 
Furthermore it illustrates the kind of love relationship
 
that Lawrence warns about in Fantasia:
 
We think that love and benevolence will cure
 
anything. Whereas [they] are our poison, poison to
 
the giver, and still more poison to the receiver.
 
Poison only because there is practically no
 
spontaneous love left in the world. It is all will,
 
the fatal love-will. . . . only deadly, exaggerated
 
volition. (80, Lawrence's emphasis)
 
Ursula and Birkin, in spite of their theorizing and
 
conceptualizing in dialogue, have similar needs; Ursula
 
wants a declaration of love from Birkin, while he seeks
 
union with her. By the end of '"Mino," Birkin finally breaks
 
down, becomes vulnerable, acquiesces to Ursula, and abandons
 
his theoretical ideals. Whether he believes in love or not
 
is beside the point; he longs for her, for union, for
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consummation. Their closing dialogue shows him weairing
 
down, and after all "the chatter, they finally embrace.
 
She put her arms around his neck. He enfolded
 
her, and kissed her subtly, murmuring in a subtle
 
voice of love, and irony, and submission:
 
^Yes,—my love, yes,—my love. Let love
 
be enough then.—I love you then—I love you.
 
I'm bored by all the rest.'
 
■Yes, ' she murmured, nestling very sweet and 
close to him. (154) 
Both Gudrun and Ursula have coaxed and cajoled their 
lovers, but only Ursula has been successful in winning the 
desired admission of love from her partner. However, by 
giving in to Ursula, Birkin's words and actions betray his 
ideal of impersonal union. In spite of this momentary 
compromise, Birkin continues to intellectualize the process 
with his "But I want it to be something else" and his 
"Because we can go one better" (154). Birkin never gives up 
his verbal quest for the ideal union, and throughout the 
novel he strives to define this ideal, but his actions here 
do not meet his ideal of star equilibrium nor do they meet 
the ideal union that Lawrence defines in the essays. 
Thus it seems that if words are incapable of 
effecting that ^strange conjunction' that Birkin 
wants, still some part of him that relies on words 
must assert itself before that other part, which is 
capable of passion, can come into being. In this 
sense, the thinking speaking self liberates the 
passionate self. (Bonds 108) 
Whether Birkin's passionate self has been liberated 
here is certainly questionable, although he does momentarily 
experience this passionate liberation in "Excurse" when he 
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and Ursula finally consummate their relationship (to be
 
discussed below in the next chapter). More significant,
 
however, is Bonds"s point that for Birkin talk is the
 
prerequisite to passion and union. He cannot avoid this
 
stage on his quest for an ideal union. Finally Lawrence
 
completes Birkin's verbal task by composing the theoretical
 
formulations of Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
 
Indeed the notion that one couple's relationship is
 
successful and the other is failed is simplistic.
 
Neverthless, Lawrence uses the Ursula/Birkin dialogues and
 
the Gerald/Gudrun dialogues to illustrate opposing views of
 
relationships as a means of exploring the concept of an
 
ideal union. "[His] theories . . . are purged and qualified
 
by the pull and thrust of human interchange—and this is
 
Lawrence's way of threshing out important problems" (Spilka
 
6).
 
The primary obstacle to Lawrence's achieving resolution
 
in the novel is, of course, the classic conflict between
 
theory and practice, between the absoluteness of the ideal
 
versus the limitations of real life experience. Schneider
 
succinctly captures Lawrence's conflict: Lawrence, "the
 
religious artist wants a heroic soul," but Lawrence, "the
 
psychologist [the realist], aware of inner weakness,
 
indecision, and continual vacillation, can find little in
 
life to correspond to his vision" (193). Although readers
 
of the novel may be left dissatisfied with Ursula and
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Birkin's relationship, their dialogues, when considered in
 
the light of the essays, become revealing and informing, as
 
they offer readers a view of an earlier stage of Lawrence's
 
theory of the unconscious and union. And what most enriches
 
the thoughts and dialogues of WIL is their exploratory
 
nature: Lawrence had not yet reached the conclusive stand
 
he was to take in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia, nor had he
 
reached the absolutist position of his later novels. As
 
Lawrence himself points out in his Foreword to WIL, he was
 
engaged in a "struggle for verbal consciousness."
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Chapter Two
 
The Narrator as Theorist
 
Narration includes both editorial commentary and plot
 
development, and it is not unusual that the narrator of WIL
 
used both aspects of narration in the novel. Neither
 
authors nor their narrators are immune to their own points
 
of view, nor should writers be expected to separate
 
themselves from their theories when they are writing.
 
Besides using Rupert Birkin's character and the love
 
dialogues to convey his view of relationships in WIL,
 
Lawrence also used WIL's narrator as a spokesperson to
 
convey his theory of individual development through union.
 
In this novel, the narrator's editorial commentary, for the
 
most part, is not disturbing. Most of the time, the
 
narrator summarizes characters' inner states and the
 
condition of the developing relationships in ways that
 
enhance the tale and one's reading of it.
 
However, at other times, the narrator's voice intrudes
 
upon the narrative experience and becomes blatantly
 
didactic. At these times, the narrator's rhetoric is lofty
 
and esoteric, and the jargon obtrudes. Although in such
 
cases readers who are unfamiliar with the psychology works
 
would not recognize that the jargon and theory being
 
expressed by WIL's narrator parallel views expressed in the
 
nonfiction texts, the sudden shift in tone and voice is
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nevertheless obvious. The narrator's rhetoric becomes most
 
stilted when Lawrence's psychology theories are being
 
expressed more consciously and directly within the novel.
 
At these times Lawrence's "struggle for verbal
 
Gohscioushess" is most acute.
 
Sometimes the narrator vacillates from moderate
 
narrative commentary to sudden didactic statements within a
 
short block of text, in some cases even within the confines
 
of a single paragraph. More often, though, Lawrence
 
juxtaposes paragraphs, sharpening the contrast between these
 
two aspects of narration. Two chapters, "Sunday Evening"
 
and "Man to Man," offer some striking examples of such
 
narrative juxtaposition, the former dealing with Ursula's
 
responses and the latter with Birkin's. "Sunday Evening"'s
 
opening paragraphs offer a description of Ursula that is
 
perfectly acceptable within the context of the unfolding
 
plot.
 
As the day wore on, the life-blood seemed to ebb
 
away from Ursula, and within the emptiness a heavy
 
despair gathered. Her passion seemed to bleed to
 
death, and there was nothing. She sat suspended in a
 
state of complete nullity, harder to bear than death.
 
''Unless something happens,• she said to herself,
 
in the perfect lucidity of final suffering, 'I shall
 
die. I am at the end of my line of life.'
 
She sat crushed and obliterated in a darkness
 
that was the border of death. She realised how all
 
her life she had been drawing nearer and nearer to
 
this brink, where there was no beyond, from which one
 
had to leap like Sappho into the unknown. The
 
knowledge of the imminence of death was like a drug.
 
Darkly, without thinking at all, she knew that she
 
was near to death. She had travelled all her life
 
along the line of fulfilment [sic], and it was nearly
 
concluded. She knew all she had to know, she had
 
ejcperiencea all she had to experience, she was
 
fulfilled in a kind of bittef ripeness, there
 
remained only to fall from the tree into death. And
 
one must fulfil [sic] one's development to the end,
 
must carry the adventure to its conclusion. And the
 
next step was over the border into death. So it was
 
then! There was a certain peace in the knowledge.
 
After all, when one was fulfilled, one was
 
happiiest^in falling into death, as a bitter fruit
 
plunges in its ripeness downwards. Death is a great
 
consummation, a consummating experience. it is a
 
development from life. That we know, while we are
 
yet living. What then need we think for further?
 
One can never see beyond the consummation. it is
 
enough that death is a great and conclusive
 
experience. Why should we ask what comes after the
 
experience, when the experience is still unknown to
 
us? Let us die, since the great experience is the
 
one that follows now upon all the rest, death, which
 
is the next great crisis in front of which we have
 
arrived. If we wait, if we balk the issue, we do but
 
hang about the gates in undignified uneasiness.
 
There it is, in front of us, as in front of Sappho,
 
the illimitable space. Thereinto goes the journey.
 
Have we not the courage to go on with our journey,
 
must we cry ^ I daren't.'? On ahead we will go, into
 
death, and whatever death may mean. If a man can see
 
the next step to be taken, why should he fear the
 
next but one? Why ask about the next but one? Of
 
the next step we are certain. It is the step into
 
death. (191-192)
 
Other than the narrator's overly dramatic references to
 
death and the shift from the personal "she" to the
 
impersonal "one" toward the end of the third paragraph, the
 
information regarding Ursula's despair in the first three
 
paragraphs serves reasonably as narrative explication.
 
However, the paragraph that follows moves beyond Ursula and
 
becomes the narrator's dissertation on death as the ultimate
 
consummation. This distinct pronominal shift in the fourth
 
paragraph from "one" to "we" creates significant changes in
 
rhetorical tone. Clearly the narrator has stepped to the
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podium and overtaken the text.
 
The movement in paragraph three from the statement "she 
was fulfilled in a kind of bitter ripeness, there remained 
only to fall from the tree into death" to the following "And 
one must fulfil one's development to the end" appears as a 
reasonable shift by the narrator from reporting to 
reflecting. This movement is neither too abrupt in tone nor 
too didactic in its assertion. But by the fourth paragraph/ 
the voice of the narrator has altered dramatically from 
reflection—"when one was fulfilled one was happiest in 
falling into death"—to pronouncement—"Death is a great 
consummation. . . . That we know" (191). The strong 
assertive voice that rises from these pages in the novel 
where the instructive first person "we" is used is 
reminiscent of the same powerful voice of conviction that 
Lawrence uses when making his pronouncements of theory in 
Psychoanalysis's text (to be discussed below in ch.■3). 
Besides the rhetorical shift from the first three 
paragraphs to the fourth, the narrator's presentation of 
death itself takes a considerable turn from the concrete— 
Ursula's personal desolation in the first three paragraphs—^ 
to the abstract—death as "a great . . . consummsating 
experience" in paragraph four. That there is a void in 
Ursula's life is clear at this point in the novel. She has 
neither come into her own "spontaneous being" nor realized 
an eguilibriated union with another. The real topic here is 
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life, not death. It is a definition by negation; the
 
absence of life within brings death. In the novel, Lawrence
 
first must study those who suffer this inner death before he
 
can expound in the psychology texts on how to live life.
 
And by the time of the essays, Lawrence is not discussing
 
death. Instead, he talks of life, a life that "must be
 
lived from the deep, self-responsible spontaneous centres of
 
every individual, in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic
 
relation between individuals" {Fantasia 85).
 
The hopeful view of death—death as renewal or rebirth
 
—in paragraph four plays a different role: the narrator is
 
talking about death of the ego, about death to the self, and
 
in this way anticipating Ursula and Birkin's consummation in
 
the "Excurse" chapter where for a moment they surrender ego
 
and will to the "great consummating experience." Although
 
life, not death is the predominant topic of the psychology
 
essays, Lawrence first had to explore the actual experience
 
of death within his characters before he could postulate his
 
theory of life in the essays—his theory of the unconscious
 
and union. And Ursula and Birkin become the seekers long
 
before the essays are ever formulated.
 
Also noteworthy are Ursula's directly guoted thoughts
 
and the narrator's references to her, intermittently
 
dispersed throughout these narrative pronouncements.
 
Examples of such narration are found in paragraphs that
 
follow those that have been quoted: "Her thoughts drifted
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into unconsciousness, she sat as if asleep" and^^'In a kind
 
of spiritual trance, she yielded, she gave way" (192).
 
Whether this is Lawrence's way of keeping readers wed to the
 
story, or whether he wants readers to believe that
 
eyerything in these passages represents Ursula's point of
 
view and not the narrator's--that the narrator is simply ■ 
conveying it all~can never be known. What can be concluded 
with certainty, however, when examining such examples from 
the novel, is that the narrator often intruded with strong 
didactic pronouncements, some of which reiterate the 
theories expressed in the psychology books. 
Whether such excerpts represent Ursula's thoughts or
 
the narrator's, it is nevertheless clear that Ursula, like
 
Birkin, is searching for something more. Yet her search is
 
not so ambitious as Birkin's nor are her answers so
 
definitive, except that when it comes specifically to her
 
relationship with Birkin, love is the prime requisite for
 
her. Birkin, on the other hand, presents a more elaborate
 
theory of relationships, and always the Gortditiohs for union
 
move far beyond love itself. Birkih's views fesemble those
 
of Lawrence in the psychology essays, and often the narrator
 
offers extended discussion of these views on Birkin's
 
behalf.
 
"Man to Man," the chapter that follows Ursula's "Sunday
 
Evening," not only repeats the pattern of "Sunday Evening"
 
with its shifts from narrative development to didactic
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pronouncements, but "Man to Man" also reveals the narrator's
 
reiteration of the relationship themes found in the
 
pSycliolb^ works^.^^^ This chapter opens:quite like "Sunday f
 
Eyening," only this time Birkin'senriui is being described.
 
As Ursula's responses open "Sunday Evening," so too do 

Birkih's open "Man fo Man,"with a brief description of :
 
Birkin in paragraph one ahd a lengthy critique of
 
traditional marriage in paragraph two.
 
He lay sick and unmoved, in pure opposition to
 
everything. He knew how near to breaking was the
 
vessel that held his life, He knew also how strong
 
and durable it was. And he did not care. Better a
 
thousand times take one's chance with death, than
 
accept a life one did not want. But best of all to
 
persist and persist and persist for ever, till one
 
were satisfied in life, (emphasis added)
 
He knew that Ursula was referred back to him.
 
He knew his life rested with her. But he would
 
rather not live than accept the love she proffered.
 
The old way of love seemed a dreadful bondage, a sort
 
of conscription. . . . (199)
 
"Man to Man"'s first paragraph directly parallels
 
"Sunday Evening"'s first paragraph: both describe the
 
breakdown in each character; both are in line with the
 
narrative movement; and both consider death as an
 
alternative. However, there is one exception: Birkin must
 
"persist"; he cannot give in. It is Birkin's task to find
 
the ideal relationship, to formulate a theory, and
 
ultimately to realize his—and Lawrence•s—"struggle for
 
verbal consciousness." He continues his quest in the next
 
paragraph with a lengthy critique of traditional marriage
 
and love (not fully cited above). From Birkin's original
 
42
 
  
attack on marriage in thg secoi|d;|^ "Man to Man,"
 
the text continues to vacillate between criticism and
 
Splution.
 
■ On the whole, he hated sex, it was such a 
limitation. It was sex that turned a man into a 
broken half of a couple, the woman into the other 
broken half. And he wanted to be single in himself, 
the woman single in her self. He wanted sex to 
revert to the level of other appetites, to be 
regarded as a functional process, not as a 
fulfilment. He believed in sex marriage. But beyond 
this, he wanted a further conjunction, where man had 
being and woman had being, two pure beings, each 
constituting the freedom of the other, balancing each 
other like two poles of one force, like two angels, 
■ or two demons. 
He wanted so much to be free, not under the
 
compulsion of any need for unification, or tortured
 
by unsatisfied desire. Desire and aspiration should
 
find their object without all this torture, as now,
 
in a world of plenty of water, simple thirst is
 
inconsiderable, satisfied almost unconsciously. And
 
he wanted to be with Ursula as free as with himself,
 
single and clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised
 
with her. The merging, the clutching, the mingling
 
of love was become madly abhorrent to him. (199-200)
 
The first of these paragraphs succinctly summarizes
 
Lawrence's theory of individual development via the
 
unconscious and via union with another, specifically in its
 
last sentence, "But beyond, he wanted further conjunction,
 
where man had being and woman had being, pure beings, each
 
constituting the freedom of the other. . . ." Its language
 
is simple and its syntax direct. The phrases "balancing
 
each other like two poles of one force" and "single and
 
clear and cool, yet balanced, polarised" echo Birkin's
 
theory of eguilibrium in "Mino" and anticipate Lawrence's in
 
Psycoanalysis and Fantasia.
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The narrator is reiterating Lawrence's theories, but
 
more significantly the narrator does so through Birkin's
 
thoughts, and it is Birkin's fear of merging and Birkin's
 
desire to preserve individuality for himself and for Ursula
 
that is the main concern in these two paragraphs. in
 
PsychpanalysIs Lawrehce extends Birkin's concerns by
 
elabprating on the dangers of fusion and the neGessity of
 
preserving individuality in relationships. However,
 
Lawrence had to first btihg t ideas to"verbal
 
conpciouenesS'' through Birkin and the narrator before he
 
could articulate his theory in Psychoanalysis:
 
A soul cannot come into its own through that love
 
alone which is unison. If it stress the one mode,
 
the sympathetic mode, beyond a certain point, it
 
breaks its own integrity, and corruption sets in in
 
the living organism. On both planes of love, upper
 
and lower, the two modes must act complementary to
 
one another, the sympathetic and the separtist. . . .
 
The goal of life is the coming to perfection of
 
each single individual. This cannot take place
 
without the tremendous interchange of love from all
 
the four great poles of the first, basic field of
 
consciousness. There must be the twofold passionate
 
flux of sympathetic love. . ; . And there must be the
 
twofold passional circuit of separatist realization,
 
the lower, vital self-realization and the upper,
 
intense realization of the other. . . . (240-241,
 
Lawrence's emphasis)
 
In the two "Man to Man" paragraphs previously cited,
 
unlike the "Sunday Evening" section on death, the narrator's
 
voice is not as stilted, the discussion is not as lofty, nor
 
is the jargon as foreign to the reader's ear. Also, these
 
paragraphs are more readily acceptable as Birkin's thoughts
 
than is the narration acceptable as Ursula's thoughts in
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"Sunday Evening" because Birkin habitually carries on
 
verbally in this way. Nevertheless, these issues are not
 
only Birkin's issues; they anticipate the psychology books.
 
Yet in spite of the more down^tb'-earth tone and language in
 
these fitst two pages of "Man to Man," the narrator cannot
 
resist the temptation to elevate his rhetoric, closing this
 
beginning reflection with two veri^ose paragraphs.
 
And why? why should we consider ourselves, men
 
and women, as broken fragments of one whole. It is
 
not true. We are not broken fragments of one whole.
 
Rather we are the singling away into purity and clear
 
being, of things that were mixed. Rather the sex is
 
that which remains in us of the mixed, the
 
unresolved. And passion is the further separating of
 
this mixture, that which is manly being taken into
 
the being of the man, that which is womanly passing
 
to the woman, till the two are clear and whole as
 
angels, the admixture of sex in the highest sense
 
surpassed, leaving two single beings constellated
 
together like two stars.
 
In the old age, before sex was, we were mixed,
 
each one a mixture. The process of singling into
 
individuality resulted in the great polarisation of
 
sex. The womanly drew to one side, the manly to the
 
other. But the separation was imperfect even then.
 
And so our world-cycle passes. There is now to come
 
the new day, when we are beings each of us, fulfilled
 
in difference. The man is pure man, the woman pure
 
woman, they are perfectly polarised. But there is no
 
longer any of the horrible merging, mingling self-

abnegation of love. There is only the pure duality
 
of pblarisation, each one free from any contamination
 
of the other; In each, the individual is primal, sex
 
is subordihate, but perfectly polarised. Each has a
 
single, separate being, with its own laws. The man
 
h^^^ hers. Each acknowledges
 
the perfection of the pblarised sex-circuit. Each
 
admits the different nature in the other. (200-201)
 
The first person "we" has emerged again in conjunction
 
w^ voice of didacticism. Lawrence's readers are being
 
ihstructed in these two paragraphs, not so much by Birkin as
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by the narratori Although the ideas are Birkin's> the tone
 
and the voice are more a^ The "pure duality of
 
polarisation/" also referred to as star equilibrium by
 
Birkin in "Mino," is continually reiterated here in contrast
 
to the "merging, the clutching, th# m.ingling of ldve" whi
 
Birkin thinks a page earlier is "madly abhorrent to him."
 
This idea is central to Lawrence's theory of the unconscious
 
and union as it is expressed in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
 
Lawrence tells "us" readers in Fantasia that "[we] either
 
love too much, or impose our will too much, are too
 
spiritual or too sensual," and he admonishes "us" readers
 
"to learn to live from the centre of our own own
 
responsibility only, and let other people do the same" (47).
 
In keeping with Birkin's concern for preserving the
 
individual-—"pure" manhood and "pure" womanhood—in
 
relationships, Lawrence extends the discussion in Fantasia:
 
But even in its profoundest, and most elemental
 
movements, the soul is still individual. . . . And
 
though we have a potential dynamic sexual connection,
 
we men, with almost every woman, yet the great
 
outstanding fact of the individuality even of the
 
blood makes us need a corresponding individuality in
 
the woman we are to embrace. (174 & 175)
 
H. M. Daleski succinctly captures the union that Lawrence,
 
Birkin, and the narrator have been wrestling with verbally:
 
"The relationship is envisaged as a meeting on equal terms
 
of two people who have themselves achieved full
 
individuality and transcend their duality in the balance
 
that is attained between them" (107).
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Overall, this three-page discussion can be accepted as
 
Birkin's as it reflects the issues he has been grappling
 
with in his dialgoues with Ursula. At the same time, the
 
discussion can be accepted as Lawrence's because it
 
anticipates the ideas later expressed in the essays.
 
Nevertheless this entire section of the novel is expressed
 
directly in the narrative voice and not in Birkin's. And in
 
an effort to preserve narrative credibility and flow, the
 
narrator closes this section with a reminder that these are
 
Birkin's thoughts we have been privy to just before Gerald's
 
arrival~"So Birkin meditated Whilst he was ill. . . . and
 
things came to him clear and sure" (201). In contrast, when
 
concluding the "Sunday Evening" meditations just before
 
Birkin arrives to see Ursula, the narrator does not directly
 
assign these meditations to Ursula: "Ursula sat quite still
 
and quite forgotten. . . . gone into the ultimate darkness
 
of her own soul" (194).
 
As a meditative chapter, "Man to Man" offers yet
 
another vivid example of how WIL serves as an explorative
 
beginning to the psychology theories expressed in the
 
essays. The union that both Lawrence (in the psychology
 
essays) and Birkin (in the novel) are seeking must be
 
eternal and impersonal, but not controlling—not "The
 
merging, the clutching, the mingling of love" which is
 
"madly abhorrent" to Birkin^ (200). Such a union must
 
represent a balance between the "sympathetic" and
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"separatist" modes that Lawrence contrasts in Psychoanalysis
 
(cited abp:^ev p• 44)V Uitimatelyy,, it is in the two
 
consuramatioh Ghapters, "Excurse" and "Death and Love,"that
 
the narrator illustrates, through Ursula/Birkin and
 
Gerald/Gudrun, the contrasts between an impersonal union and
 
a smothering union.
 
The narrator's judgment of each couple's relationship
 
is revealed early in these chapters in descriptions of each
 
partner, and later, in descriptions of their consummation.
 
In "Excurse," Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn
 
creatures whereas in "Death and Love" Gerald and Gudrun are
 
described as doomed creatures. Birkin "was as if born out
 
of the cramp of a womb" (311), "as if he had just come
 
awake, like a thing that is born, like a bird when it comes
 
out of an egg, into a new universe" (312), and Ursula "was
 
beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an
 
essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease,
 
her complete self" (314). Spilka's observation that
 
Lawrence saw sex "as a religious communion, an inclusive
 
expression of the force of life itself, which nourishes and
 
renews the true self, the second ego, the individual soul of
 
each of the lovers" (216) is evident in the narrator's
 
description of Ursula and Birkin. It is important to note
 
again that Lawrence searches for his ideal union through
 
Ursula and Birkin, and that although they do not meet his
 
ideal by novel's end, they do momentarily experience his
 
"religious communion" in the "Excurse" chapter. Lawrence
 
further stresses his vision of an ideal union by the
 
contrasting fatal union between Gerald and Gudrun.
 
The promise of new life in "Excurse" starkly opposes
 
the fatal descriptions of Gerald and Gudrun in "Death and
 
Love," the fpilowing chapter. Gudrun "felt as if she were
 
caught at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and
 
fatal trap," (325), and only three pages later, we are told
 
that "She died a little death" (329); "She sipped the
 
poison" (329). As for Gerald, "A dangerous resolve formed
 
in his heart. . . . He would not go back tonight till he had
 
come to her, if it cost him his life. He staked his all on
 
his throw"^ (339).
 
Along with the juxtaposition of chapter pairs, Lawrence
 
uses parallel structural patterns within these chapters to
 
illustrate the contrast between the two couples. Besides
 
the initial character descriptions in "Excurse" and "Death
 
and Love," two intimate encounters are experienced by each
 
couple in each chapter. By chapter's end each couple
 
realizes full consummation in the second encounter. Ursula
 
and Birkin's first physical intimacies occur at the
 
Southwell inn, with their consummation under the night sky
 
in the open, natural setting of Sherwood Forest; conversely,
 
Gerald and Gudrun begin their embraces under a bridge while
 
walking home and consummate their relationship in the
 
stifling, secretive confines of Gudrun's bedroom.
 
The first paragraph that describes Ursula and Birkin's
 
coming together in the parlor of the inn identifies a
 
transition for them from continuous discussion to a non
 
verbal, felt experience.
 
He stood on the hearth-rug looking at her, at
 
her face that was upturned exactly like a flower> a
 
fresh, luminous flower, glinting faintly golden with
 
the dew of the first light. And he was smiling
 
faintly as if there were no speech in the world, save
 
the silent delight of flowers in each other.
 
Smilingly they delighted in each other's presence,
 
pure presence, not to be thought of, even known.
 
(312-313)
 
Not only have Ursula and Birkin moved beyond their
 
"Struggle for verbal consciousness,"they have entered a new
 
realm, the realm of the unconscious, where knowledge exists
 
at a level bdybnd mental consciousness--where reality need
 
not be articulated. This becomes the essence of the
 
unconscious as it is defined in the first essay.
 
Psychoanalysis.
 
By the unconscious we wish to indicate that essential
 
unique nature of every individual creature, which is,
 
by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable,
 
inconceivable. It cannot be conceived, it can only
 
be experienced. (214)
 
From the unconscious to the body centers, which are
 
also defined in the psychology essays, the novel moves on to
 
describe their physical meeting.
 
She traced with her hands the line of his loins
 
and thighs, at the back, and a living fire ran
 
through her, from him, darkly. It was a dark flood
 
of electric passion she released from him, drew into
 
herself. She had established a rich new circuit, a
 
new current of passional electric energy, between the
 
two of them, released from the darkest poles of the
 
body and established in perfect circuit. It was a
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 dark fire of electricity that rushed from him to her,
 
and flooded them both with rich peace, satisfaction,
 
[brief dialogue omitted]
 
She closed her hands over the full, rounded body
 
of his loins, as he stooped over her, she seemed to
 
touch the quick of the mystery of darkness that was
 
bodily him. She seemed to faint beneath, and he
 
seemed to faint, stooping over her. It was a perfect
 
passing away for both of them, and at the same time
 
the most intolerable accession into being, the
 
marvellous fulness of immediate gratification,
 
overwhelming, outflooding from the Source of the
 
deepest life-force, the darkest, deepest, strangest
 
life-source of the human body, at the back and base
 
of the loins.
 
. . . She had thought there was no source deeper
 
than the phallic source. And now, behold, from the
 
smitten rock of the man's body, from the strange
 
marvellous flanks and thighs, deeper, further in
 
mystery than the phallic source, came the floods of
 
ineffable darkness and ineffable riches. (313-314)
 
The significance in these paragraphs is not the
 
sensuality of Birkin's loins as Ursula connects with him,
 
but her discovery of "the deepest life-force. . .of the
 
human body, at the back and base of the loins" and the "rich
 
new circuit" that has been established between them,
 
according to the narrator, a "perfect circuit" (314). All
 
that Lawrence may appear to be doing here is glorifying and
 
elevating Ursula and Birkin's union; however, he is doing
 
much more. "His interest in sexual relations is most
 
fundamentally an interest in extending their meaning, not a
 
mere fascination with their intensity" (Miko, Intro. 10).
 
And for Lawrence in the novel, Birkin and Ursula become a
 
means of exploring the possibility for ideal union, the
 
ideal union that he defines more explicitly in the essays.
 
In these paragraphs from "Excurse," Lawrence begins to
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experimfent with the concept of body centers as critical
 
connections between two people; then from a biological
 
perspective in the psychology essays, Lawrence begins his
 
necessary effort to establish scientific credibility for
 
this theory of "equilibrium." The following excerpt from
 
Fantasia defines the four primary body centers, according to
 
Lawrence, our "first field of dynamic consciousness":
 
The solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion, great
 
nerve-centres below the diaphragm, act as the dynamic
 
origin of all consciousness in man, and are
 
immediately polarized by the other two nerve-centres,
 
the cardiac plexus and the thoracic ganglion above
 
the diaphragm. At these four poles the whole flow,
 
both within the individual and from without him of
 
dynamic consciousness and dynamic creative
 
relationship is centered.® (103)
 
None of the preceding citations that describe Ursula
 
and Biirkin's first meeting discuss directly the unconscious
 
or the body centers, yet the descriptions of the couple's
 
experience reveal Lawrence's early examination of these
 
concepts unfolding first in WIL before they are discussed in
 
the essays.
 
Far more concrete and far less mysterious is Gerald and
 
Gudrun's initial physical encounter in "Death and Love."
 
So, under the bridge, they came to a standstill,
 
and he lifted her upon his breast. His body vibrated
 
taut and powerful as he closed upon her and crushed
 
her, breathless and dazed and destroyed, crushed her
 
upon his breast. Ah, it was terrible, and perfect.
 
Under this bridge, the colliers pressed their lovers
 
to their breast. And now, under the bridge, the
 
master of them all pressed her to himself! And how
 
much more powerful and terrible was his embrace than
 
theirs, how much more concentrated and supreme his
 
love was, than theirs, in the same sort! She felt
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she would swoon, die, under the vibrating, inhuman
 
tension,of his arms and his body—^she- would pass
 
away. Then the unthinkable high vibration slackened
 
and became more undulating,- he slackened and drew her
 
with him to stand with his back to the wall.
 
She was almost unconscious. So the colliers'
 
lovers would stand with their backs to the walls,
 
holding their sweethearts and kissing them as she was
 
being kissed.—Ah, but would their kisses be fine and
 
powerful as the kisses of the firm-mouthed master?
 
Even the keen, short-cut moustache—the colliers
 
would not have that. (330-331)
 
The language is more violent and overpowering here, and
 
there is no indication of connection, of a "rich new
 
circuit." In this excerpt Gerald's power—his "taut and
 
powerful" body (330), "the ffrm-mouthed master" (331)—and
 
his conquest over Gudrun are detailed. And Gudrun is
 
enamored of Gerald's external status, "the master of them
 
all" (330). Lawrence defines their relationship in
 
Fantasia: "It is all will, the fatal love-will. . . . There
 
is now only deadly, exaggerated volition. . . .We want to
 
put all life under compulsion" (80-81, Lawrence's emphasis).
 
There is no balance, no equilibrium between these two.
 
There isn't even the "horrible mingling" and "merging" that
 
Birkin has condemned. Instead, Gudrun is overtaken, is
 
consumed by Gerald.
 
His arms were fast round her, he seemed to be
 
gathering her into himself, her warmth, her softness,
 
her adorable weight, drinking in the suffusion of her
 
physical being, avidly. He lifted her, and seemed to
 
pour her into himself, like wine into a cup. (331)
 
Unlike the violent interaction and the isolation of
 
Gerald and Gudrun's embrace, unlike their "balance . . . in
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opposition" (329), the narrator describes a potentially
 
ideal union between Birkin and Ursula that is reminscent of
 
Birkin's quest in "Mino" for a relationship with Ursula like
 
"two single equal stars balanced in conjunction" (151).
 
Also, this description by the narrator anticipates the
 
consumination that is to take place between Ursula and Birkin
 
a page later.
 
She sat in a fullness and a pure potency that
 
was like apathy, mindless and immobile. She was next
 
to him, and hung in a pure rest, as a star is hung,
 
balanced unthinkably.—-Still there remained a dark
 
lambency of anticipation. She would touch him. With
 
perfect fine finger-tips of reality she would touch
 
the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable
 
reality of his loins of darkness. To touch,
 
mindlessly in darkness, to come in pure touching upon
 
the living reality of him, his suave, perfect loins
 
and thighs of darkness, this was her sustaining
 
anticipation.
 
And he, too, waited in the magical steadfastness
 
of suspense, for her to take this knowledge of him as
 
he had taken it of her. He knew her darkly, with the
 
fulness of dark knowledge. Now she would know him,
 
and he too would be liberated. He would be night-

free, like an Egyptian, steadfast in perfectly
 
suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality of
 
physical being. They would give each other this
 
star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)
 
This passage reveals glimpses of Lawrence's early musings on
 
the profound unconscious form of knowledge that he was to
 
define later in Psychoanalysis:
 
We know it by direct experience. All the best part
 
of knowledge is inconceivable. . . . Knowledge is
 
always a matter of whole experience . . . and never a
 
matter of mental conception merely. This is indeed
 
the point of all full knowledge: that it is contained
 
mainly within the unconscious, its mental or
 
cohscious reference being only a sort of extract or
 
shadow. (215)
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However, in the preceding excerpt from "Excurse,"
 
Lawrence, through the narrator's use of the anticipatory
 
modal "would," must first review the criteria for ideal
 
union before he can describe the actual consununation between
 
Ursula and Birkin, let alone before he can talk about
 
unconscious knowledge in the essays. Such preliminaries are
 
unnecessary for Gerald and Gudrun's consummation in "Death
 
and Love" because Lawrence is not attempting to describe an
 
unknown ideal union. Instead Lawrence describes the reality
 
of destructive union. "Their ^love' is a perverse
 
sexuality, a form of ontological masturbation in which the
 
partner is nothing more than an instrument for the
 
perfection of the Self. . . . that reguires a kind of
 
annihilation of the Self or of the Other" (Adamowski 354­
355). Gerald has a need which he fills at Gudrun's expense.
 
He had come for vindication. She let him hold
 
her in his arms, clasp her close against him. He
 
found in her an infinite relief. Into her he poured
 
all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he
 
was whole again. . . . And she, subject, received him
 
as a vessel filled with his bitter potion of death.
 
She had no power at this crisis to resist. The
 
terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and
 
she received it in an ecstasy of. subjection, in
 
throes of acute, violent sensation. (344)
 
Gerald's need to be "whole again" and to find "an
 
infinite relief" (344) dominates the union, erasing the
 
possibility of "star equilibrium" with Gudrun. Of great
 
significance is the narrator's choice of verbs to describe
 
Gerald's participation in this consummation—"he poured,"
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"he plunged," "he buried," "he Gleaved," and the adjectives
 
that describe Gerald's response to to Gudrun—-"dissolving
 
and sinking to rest," "healed," "whole again," "made whole,"
 
"palpitating with new life" (344-345). The only verb
 
applied to Gudrun in these two pages is "received"; she has
 
become no more than a passive recipient of Gerald's anguish.
 
"But Gudrun lay wide awake, destroyed into perfect [mental]
 
consciousness" (not to be confused with LawrenCe's;ideal
 
unconscious), while Gerald enjoyed "the sleep of coriiplete
 
exhaustion and restoration"^ (345). Neither Gerald nor
 
Gudrun has experienced Lawrence'spristiheUhcbnscigus state
 
through their union. Instead, Gerald has escaped reality,
 
while Gudrun remains imprisoned in full mental
 
consciousness.
 
Conversely, after their actual consummation in
 
"Excurse," both Birkin and Ursula"slept the chillyv h^
 
through . . . a night of unbroken sleep" (320). Also the
 
consummation itself is less aggressive than Gerald and
 
Gudrun's. "Touch" is the primary verb used to describe both
 
Ursula's and Birkin's participation in this union, and it is
 
through "touch" that "knowledge" of the other is gained.
 
[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon
 
her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the
 
eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable
 
revelation of living otherness.
 
[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic] 
of unspeakable communication in touch . . ■ . the 
reality of that which can never be known . . . never 
be transmuted into mind content. . . . For she was 
to him what he was to her, the immemorial 
magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness. 
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(320)
 
]!^preover, tlie Jcnowledge Pf pQuch being described by th^
 
narrator aligns perfeetly with Lawrence'S subsequent
 
definition of knowledge in the essays:
 
The aim is not mental consciousness. We want
 
effectual human beings, not conscious ones. The
 
final aim is npt to know, but to Jbe. (Fantasia 68)
 
The vast bulk of consciousness is non-cerebral. It
 
is the sap of our life, of all life. (Psychoanalysis
 
217)
 
Ursula and Birkin have moved beyond the intense verbal
 
exchanges of earlier chapters to another realm, the realm of
 
touch. So touch for Ursula and Birkin becomes a mattPr of
 
"whole experience," (Psychoanalysis 215) a "non-cerebral"
 
(Psychoanalysis 217) way to know one another more fully.
 
"Lawrence's thematic use of his psycho-biological theory of
 
the unconscious may be seen in his treatment of touch . . .
 
that it activates unconscious instinctual motives, not
 
rationally conceived ideas, into consciousness, thus making
 
both self-confrontation and encounter with the other
 
possible" (Cowan 27). By the time the psychology essays are
 
written, Lawrence has figured out the significance of
 
"knowledge of the other," and he postulates that by learning
 
through union with another who we are not, we can come to
 
realize our own individuality:
 
Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness - the
 
outgoing, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of the
 
sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the
 
beloved - and then the complementary objective
 
realization of the beloved, the realization of that
 
which is apart, different. This realization is like
 
riches to the objective consciousness. It is, as it
 
were, the adding of another self to the own self.
 
{Psychoanalysis 239-240)
 
in this: way, thxough union and knowledge of "another,"
 
individuals ca^n inore fully become themselves, not through
 
merging or isolation, but through "star eguilibrium"—that
 
ideal "polarity" between two people v ljawrence's "knowledge
 
Of the other" reflects the later post-str'uctural notion of
 
difference: "Although it would be an overstatement to say
 
that Lawrence is a precursor of post-structuralism, he was
 
the first English writer to forward the notion of utter,
 
uncontained difference" (Jewinski 7).
 
In addition to Ursula and Birkin's newfound "knowledge"
 
of one another gained through "touch," the other significant
 
feature of their consummation is the "mindlessness," the
 
"unspeakable communication" that characterizes their union.
 
This state of "mindlessness" aligns with Lawrence's idea of
 
the unconscious—that deeper level where, he believed,
 
"truth" and fullness of experience could be found.
 
"Lawrence's knowledge of this first place of experience
 
permeates his writing. He returns again and again to a mode
 
of knowing in which consciousness of another cannot be
 
grasped in 'cognitive' diacritical terms" (Schwartz 217).
 
In Fantasia Lawrence further defines the value of this
 
mindlessness or unconscious state as it relates to
 
consummation: "The mystery must remain in its dark secrecy,
 
and its dark, powerful dynamism. The reality of sex lies in
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 the great dynamic convulsions in the soul. And as such it
 
should be realized, a great creative^conclusive seizure upon
 
the soul" (113-114).
 
In "Excurse," the narrator is celebrating Ursula and
 
Birkin•s total abandonment of the mental and their mutual
 
participation with one another at the unconscious, non
 
verbal level. Birkin's "fingers upon her unrevealed nudity
 
were the fingers of silence upon silence," and Ursula
 
"touched, she received the maximums [sic] of unspeakable
 
communication in touch, dark, subtle, positively silent"
 
(320). It has taken them two-thirds of the novel and much
 
talking to get to this point. "For she was to him what he
 
was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable,
 
real otherness" (320). Birkin and Ursula's consummation may
 
be a non-verbal experience, but it is the narrator's verbal
 
expression of their consummation that epitomizes Lawrence's
 
ideal theory of the unconscious and union with the other.
 
Ragussis points out that this "state beyond language is,
 
paradoxically, wed to language" (198), as the narrator's
 
voice must often rise above the actual narrative experience,
 
especially over Birkin and Ursula's silence. "But," as Bell
 
indicates, "wordlessness is not an option in fiction; not,
 
at least, for the author" (167), nor for the narrator.
 
In Ursula and Birkin's consummation readers can find
 
the seed of Lawrence's pristine unconscious and ideal union
 
coming to fruition through the narrator's words. However,
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their union, only a momentary experience of less than a
 
page, is not indicative of the Ursula/Birkin relationship
 
throughout the novel, and certainly not in keeping with
 
their relationship by novel's end. Nevertheless, Ursula and
 
Birkin were thejprimary site of Lawrence's exploration in
 
preparation of the theories he eventually outlined in the
 
essays. Although by contrast Gerald and Gudrun's is the
 
failed relationship, Ursula and Birkin can only represent
 
the potential for Lawrence's ideal union in the novel.
 
Through Birkin and Ursula's consummation, WIL's
 
narrator explores what an ideal union might be, but neither
 
Lawrence nor his narrator resolve these theoretical issues
 
in the novel. While resolution was not the outcome for
 
Lawrence in WIL^ exploration was his primary rhetorical
 
preoccupation. ','The result is,a kind of novel of discovery,
 
didactic but experimental, prophetic but obedient to the
 
dictates of experience" (Spilka 6).
 
Frequently I in WIL Lawrence is assisted by "a narrative
 
voice which so heightens the implications of the ostensible
 
action that in some ways the narrative voice is more primary
 
than the action it describes" (Bell 213). WIL's narrator
 
had to intrude frequently upon the narrative experience
 
itself, thereby assisting Lawrence in his "struggle for
 
verbal consciousness" within the novel. Lawrence would
 
finally achieve !full theoretical expression only in the
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psychology texts.
 
60
 
Chapter Three
 
Theory Formulated in the Essays
 
Thus far in examining Lawrence's Women in Love as a
 
prelude to his two psychology essays, my analysis has
 
considered the exploratory and sometimes didactic role that
 
dialogue and narration played in the development of
 
Lawrence's significant themes of the uncdnsGious and union.
 
Also noteworthy are the claims that Lawrence himself made 

about each work and the relationship between his fiction and
 
his nonfiction/ between WIL and the essays. |
 
In his Foreword to WIL, Lawrence explains that his i;
 
novel is a record of his "own desires, aspirations,
 
struggles/" and that^ for verhai consciousness"
 
is "not superimpositon of a theory" but his own "passionate
 
struggle into conscious being" {Phoneix II 275-276, emphasis
 
added). Certainly Lawrence's claim that he has not
 
superimposed his theory upon his art is arguable, but his
 
"struggle for verbal consciousness" is not disputable. The
 
novel's text clearly reveals this struggle through dialogue,
 
particulary through the character of Rupert Birkin.
 
Overall Rupert and Ursula's many conversations reflect
 
both Rupert's and Lawrence's earnest effort to articulate a
 
theory of individual development through union. As well,
 
the narrator's didactic intrusions reflect early
 
formulations of Lawrence's theories. Neyertheless, Lawrence
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does not fully articulate his theories until he writes the
 
two psychology essays.
 
Some four to five years after WIL, when Lawrence wrote
 
the essays, he explained his effort to articulate his
 
theories in his foreword to Fantasia:
 
This pseudo-philosophy of mine - ^pollyanalytics', as
 
one of my respected critics might say - is deduced
 
from the novels and poems, not the reverse. The
 
novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen.
 
And then the absolute need which one has for some
 
sort of satisfactory mental attitude towards oneself
 
and things in general makes one try to abstract some
 
definite conclusions from one's experiences as a >
 
writer and as a man. The novels and poems are pure
 
passionate experience. These 'pollyanalytics' are
 
inferences made afterwards, from the experience.
 
■■ ■ x;.' 
The purpose of this study—to show that Lawrence began
 
to develop his psychology theories in his fiction—aligns
 
with Lawrence's first claim that he deduced the theories
 
from the novel. However, his second claim that the novel
 
came "unwatched out of [his] pen" is certainly contradicted
 
by the preceding examination of both dialogue and narration
 
in WIL. Although Lawrence's "struggle for verbal
 
consciousness" in WIL can be seen in not fully articulated
 
theories, nevertheless, his effort to develop these theories
 
through the novel was indeed conscious and deliberate.
 
In the paragraph that follows the one previously cited
 
from Fantasia*s foreword, Lawrence makes even more claims
 
about his unconscious intention when writing fiction:
 
And finally, it seems to me that even art is utterly
 
dependent on philosophy: or if you prefer it, on a
 
metaphysic. The metaphysic or philosophy may not be
 
anywhere very accurately stated and may be quite
 
unconscious, in the artist, yet it is a metaphysic
 
that governs men at the time, and is by all men more
 
or less comprehended, and lived. . . . Then it is
 
unfolded into life and art. (15)
 
Lawrence's claims here can be considered at best
 
ingenuous or paradoxical, at worst contradictory. On the
 
one hand he claims that his metaphysic governs him as he
 
writes, yet on the other, he suggests that he "may be"
 
unconsciously developing his metaphysic as he writes. More
 
to the point, Lawrence's romantic notion of unconscious
 
metaphysical emanation is overruled by WIL's text and its
 
many examples of early theoretical development through
 
narration and dialogue. The parallels between the
 
psychology essays' theory of the unconscious and union and
 
WIL's preliminary articulation of these theories, as well as
 
the jargon found in both, reveal a deliberate, conscious
 
effort by Lawrence, the novelist, to develop his "metaphysic
 
or philosopy" in WIL. The polemic intention is not
 
unconscious, nor is the argument unconsciously "stated" in
 
the novel.
 
Lawrence's insistence that the artist's intention is
 
subserved to some higher form of truth was not new to him
 
when he wrote Fantasia. In the earliest version of Studies
 
in Classical American Literature (SCAL hereafter), completed
 
shortly after he had finished writing WIL but before the
 
essays, Lawrence defined the artist's dual role: "first,
 
the didactic import given by the author from his own moral
 
consciousness, and then the profound symbolic import which
 
proceeds from his unconscious or subconscious soul" {The
 
Symbolic Meaning 19). In SCAL's final version, written at
 
the same time he was writing the psychology essays, Lawrence
 
is even more emphatic: "The essential function of art is
 
moral. . . . But a passionate, implicit morality, not
 
didactic. A morality which changes the blood, rather than
 
the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind follows later,
 
in the wake" (SCAL 180).
 
Finally and most telling, Lawrence explains in his
 
foreword to Fantasia his need to translate "art speech" into
 
nonfiction: "We've got to . . . find what the heart really
 
believes in after all: and what the heart really wants . . .
 
And then we've got to put it down in terms of belief and of
 
knowledge" (16). Here What the "heart really wants"
 
reiterates Lawrence's claims of (1) the theory that comes
 
unwatched from the writer's pen, (2) the artist's
 
unconscious metaphysic, and (3) the passionate morality that
 
changes the blood. And Lawrence's imperative "to put it
 
down" explains his desire to articulate his theory—to
 
translate his initial novelistic explorations in WIL into
 
theoretical expression in the psychology essays. Further,
 
through his desire "to put it down in terms of belief and of
 
knowledge," Lawrence extends art's "essential function" of
 
morality to his non-fiction texts.
 
Despite his preference for the novel as the arbiter of
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!!truth, still chose to argue his theories in essay
 
form. Psychoanalysis thus represents his first formal
 
statement on the unconscious and union after experimenting
 
with these theories in WIL. Psychoanalysis is not a dense
 
text, nor is it difficult to follow. Reading this essay
 
gives the reader a reasonable, if not clear, understanding
 
of Lawrence's theory of the unconscious, the necessity of
 
coming into "spontaneous being" through realization of the
 
unc6hs;cious aind thrpugh union with another^ "two
 
synchronizing activites" (Psychoanalysis 221).
 
Although Lawrence had talked about "blood
 
consciousness" in SCAL and had experimented extensively with
 
relationships in his narratives, he had never committed to
 
writing a formal theoretical (what he might call
 
"metaphysical" or "philosophical") statement on the
 
unconscious and union until he wrote Psychoanalysis. It is
 
early in this essay that Lawrence's first formal definition
 
of the unconscious appears:
 
We have actually to go back to our own unconscious.
 
But not the unconscious which is the inverted
 
reflection of our ideal consciousness. We must
 
discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our
 
life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. The
 
first bubbling life in us, prior to any mentality.
 
The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of
 
any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It
 
is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the
 
spontaneous origin from which it behoves [sic] us to
 
live. (212)
 
Throughout WIL, Birkin is never able to formulate a
 
formal definition like Lawrence's, indeed expressing his
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inability to do so in conversation with Ursula, first in the
 
"An Island" chapter when they have their initial discussion
 
on love:
 
*One must throw everything away, everything—let
 
everything go, to get the one last thing one wants,'
 
he said.
 
*What thing?' she asked in challenge.
 
don't know—freedom together,' he said.
 
(132)
 
In the "Mino" chapter—^the love—dialogue chapter—
 
Bitkin continues to express his uncertainty about what he is
 
seeking, and in this dialogue glimmers of Lawrence's
 
unconscious theory surface as Birkin stresses his concern
 
with preserving his own and Ursula's individuality:
 
• • I don't know. At any rate, I don't feel the
 
emotion of love for you—no, and I don't want to.
 
Because it gives out in the last issues.' [Birkin]
 
'Love gives out in the last issues?' [Ursula;
 
narration omitted]
 
'Yes, it does. At the very last, one is alone,
 
beyond the influence of love. There is a real
 
impersonal me, that is beyond love, beyond any
 
emotional relationship. So it is with you. But we
 
want to delude ourselves that love is the root.
 
. . .' [Birkin] (145)
 
The narrator echoes Birkin's concerns with preserving
 
the unconscious self later in the "Man to Man" chapter
 
through Birkin's narrated musings: "And he wanted to be
 
single in himself, the woman single in herself. . . . he
 
wanted a further conjunction, where man had being dndwbiftan
 
had baing, two pure beings/ each constituting the freedom of
 
the other . . ." (199).
 
Although Lawrence continually discusses the unconscious
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throughout Psychoanalysis, his next formal statement on the
 
unconscious appears only three pages after the previously
 
cited defintion:
 
We knoy [the unconscious] by direct experience. All
 
the best part of knowledge is inconceivable. . . .
 
Knowledge is always a matter of whole experience
 
. . . and never a matter of mental conception merely.
 
This is indeed the point of all full knowledge: that
 
it is contained mainly within the unconscious, its
 
mental or conscious reference being only a sort of
 
extract or shadow. (215)
 
In WIL Birkin and the narrator are beginning to
 
conceptualize Lawrence's preverbal, non-mental unconscious.
 
Birkin, in the "An Island" chapter, after hedging Ursula's
 
guestion, "But don't you think me good-looking?", roughly
 
summarizes Lawrence's non-mental unconscious in his response
 
to her query:
 
I want to find you, where you don't know your
 
own existence, the you that your common self denies
 
utterly. But I don't want your good looks, and I
 
don't want your womanly feelings, and I don't want
 
your thoughts nor opinions nor your ideas—they are
 
all bagatelles to me. (147)
 
Birkin is striving to find this unconscious state both
 
in himself and in Ursula, and in the "Excurse" chapter the
 
quest is finally realized. But in "Excurse" the narrator's
 
utterances reify Lawrence's non-mental unconscious through
 
descriptions of Ursula and Birkin's impending consummation—
 
through an experience defined by its mindlessness and the
 
knowledge of touch-

She sat in a fulness and a pure potency that was like
 
apathy, mindless and immobile. . . . she would touch
 
the reality in him, the suave, pure, untranslateable
 
reality. . . . To touch, mindlessly in darkness, to
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 come in pure touching upon the living reality of him
 
And he, too. . . . He knew her darkly, with the
 
fullness of dark knowledge . . . (319)
 
These examples clearly prefigure as well as reinforce
 
Lawrence's claim in Psychoanalysis that "[we] know [the
 
unconscious] by direct experience. All the best part of
 
knowledge is inconceivable" (215).
 
Even though the WIL dialogues and narration do not
 
present a formal defintion of the unconscious, as do the
 
essays, nevertheless WIL does begin to formulate Lawrence's
 
conception of the unconscious as Birkin and Ursula guest for
 
an ideal relationship. Lawrence extends their guest by
 
defining the ideal union in his essays.
 
For the end, the goal is the perfecting of each
 
single individuality, unique in itself - which cannot
 
take place without a perfected harmony between the
 
beloved, a harmony which depends on the at-last­
clarified singleness of each being, a singleness
 
eguilibrized, polarized in one by the counter-posing
 
singleness of the other. Psychoanalysis (222,
 
emphasis added)
 
Birkin's discussion of union in the "Mino" chapter
 
closely paraphrases Lawrence's ideal union of equilibrium
 
expressed in the preceding excerpt from Psychoanalysis.
 
Although not verbatim, Birkin captures the essay's
 
significant idea of "singleness equilibrized, polarized" in
 
union when he tells Ursula:
 
What I want is a strange conjunction with you
 
. . . not meeting and mingling;—you are quite
 
right:—but an equilibrium, a pure balance of two
 
single beings:—as the stars balance each other.
 
(148, emphasis added)
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Later in "Mino" Birkin again explains:
 
[It] is the:1^ of creation^ On&^ Qhe
 
must commit oneself to a conjunction with the other—
 
forever. But it is not seifless--it is a maintaining
 
of the self in mystic balance and integrity-^-like a
 
star balanced with another star. (152)
 
Lawrence's simultaneous "singleness" and "conjunction"
 
agrees with Lacan's theory "that all notions of selfhood
 
must be seen with two facts in mind: inevitable inequality
 
(difference) and unavoidable singleness (utter oneness)"
 
(Jewinski 9).
 
Albeit a suspended moment in the novel, Ursula and
 
Birkin do fulfill their ideal union in "Excurse," expressed
 
through the narrator's deliberate delivery of their
 
consummation. First, the narrator anticipates their soon-

to-be consummation as a union of equilibrium. Although not
 
so definitive as Birkin's explanation or Lawrence's,
 
nonetheless the narrator is experimenting with this idea in
 
anticipation of their consummation and of the essays, in an
 
effort to define an ideal union through Ursula and Birkin.
 
He knew her darkly, with the fulness of dark
 
knowledge. Now she would know him, and he too would
 
be liberated. He would be , . . steadfast in
 
perfectly suspended equilibrium, pure mystic nodality
 
of physical being. They would give each other this
 
star-equilibrium which alone is freedom. (319)
 
Even before "Excurse" the narrator discusses
 
equilibrium in a didactic passage represented as Birkin's
 
meditations, but it is clearly the narrator who is strongly
 
asserting these ideas about a sexual union that "[leaves]
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tw© single beings constellated tbgether like two stairs,"
 
that is "tbe perfection of the polarised se2c^circuit" (201).
 
It is also the narrator who warns against "the horrible
 
merging, irtihglingseif-abnegation of love" <201). (See ch,
 
2 above, pp. 43 & 45.)
 
bawreride's fiption had always^ preoccupied with :
 
relationships, but in WIL Lawrence's search for the ideal
 
relationship becomes more deliberate than in his previous
 
narratives. By the time he wrote WIL, Lawrence was
 
examining two opposing relationships. The opposing couples,
 
however, were simply a means for Lawrence to explore the
 
theory he was to express more comprehensively in the essays,
 
but the couples are not a definitive representation of
 
success or failure in the novel. In an effort to identify
 
the criteria of a successful union, Lawrence was examining a
 
failed relationship through Gerald/Gudrun and a potent!ally
 
ideal one through Ursula/Birkin> /
 
Through the narrator in "Excurse," Lawrence begins to
 
define his ideal of the unconscious and union with another,
 
manifesting the beginnings of his theory in Birkin and
 
Ursula's actual consummation. Birkin and Ursula do not
 
sustain this ideal beyond "Excurse"'s end, but embodied in 
their momentary union is Lawrence's ideal union. Of less 
significance to this study is Lawrence's inability to find 
resolution in the novel. More significant is the way he ■ 
used the two couples to explore his ideal theory articulated 
later in his essays-'-an ideal not fully aehieved
 
characters in the novel, but only manifested temporarily in
 
Ursula and Birkin's consummation as expressed through the
 
narrator's voice.
 
[He] gathered her to him. . . . his fingers upon
 
her unrevealed nudity . . . never to be seen with the
 
eye, or known with the mind, only known as a palpable
 
revelation of living otherness.
 
[She] touched, she received the maximums [sic]
 
of unspeakable communication in touch . . . the
 
reality of that which can never be known . . . never
 
be transmuted into mind content. . . . For she was
 
to him what he was to her, the immemorial
 
magnificence of mystid, palpabie, real otherness.
 
(320)
 
Of further significance are the parallels in language
 
between WIL and the essays. The diction used in both
 
Birkin's and the narrator's discussions of union, such as
 
"equilibrium," "polarized-circuit," and "singleness,"
 
certainly affirms Lawrence's deliberate development of these
 
ideas in the novel. Clearly Lawrence had begun developing
 
his ideas of the unconscious and union in WIL.
 
By the time Lawrence wrote his second essay. Fantasia,
 
a few months after completing Psychoanalysis, he began to
 
explore the implications of his theory of the unconscious
 
and union with another. In this second essay, he discusses
 
the differences between the ideal union and those unions
 
that fail, in much the same way he compares Ursula and
 
Birkin to Gerald and Gudrun in WIL. Lawrence develops the
 
contrast particularly in his examination of sexual
 
consummation. The following excerpts from Fantasia sound
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like a replay of the opposing consuininations portrayed: in the
 
"Excurse" and ''Death and Love'' chapters^r
 
In the act of coition . . . the two individuals . , v
 
clash into oneness. A great flash of interchange
 
occurs, like an eieetrical spark Or like lightning
 
out of the densely surcharged clouds. . . . and then
 
the tension passes-.
 
The two individuals are separate again. . . .
 
The air is as it were new, fresh, tingling with
 
newness. So is the blood of man and woman after
 
successful coition. After a false coition like
 
prostitution, there is not newness but a certain
 
[intervening paragraph omitted]
 
So the blood is changed and renewed, refreshed
 
almost re-created, like the atmosphere after thunder /
 
. . . (106-107)
 
And again in the last chapter of Fantasia the metaphor is
 
reiterated:
 
But the main thing, as in the thunder-storm, is
 
the absolute renewal of the atmosphere in this case,
 
the blood . . .
 
And in this renewal lies the great magic of sex.
 
. . . And the only possible means of relief and
 
renewal is in pure passional interchange . . ;
 
. . . Sex passion as a goal itself always leads
 
to tragedy. . . . a slow humiliation and sterility.
 
(187-188)
 
■ These descriptions resemble the narrator's references 
to each couple after consummation (see ch. 2 above, pp. 48­
49, 55-56). Birkin and Ursula are described as reborn
 
creatures. Birkin "was as if born out of the cramp of a
 
womb" (311), "as if he had just come awake, like a thing
 
that is born . . i into a new universe" (312). And Ursula
 
"was beautiful as a new marvellous flower opened" (313), "an
 
essential new being . . . quite free . . . in complete ease,
 
her complete self" (314). At chapter's end, Birkin and
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Ursula"slept the chilly night through under the hood of the
 
car, a night of unbroken sleep": (320).:
 
Conversely, Gerald and Gudrun are described in fatal
 
terms after their consummation. Gudrun "felt as if she were
 
caught at last by fate, imprisoned in some horrible and
 
fatal trap" (325); "She died a little death" (329); "She
 
sipped the poison" (329). As for Gerald, "A dangerous
 
resolve formed in his heart. . . . He would not go back to
 
night till he had come to her, if it cost him his life. He
 
staked his all on his throw" (339). Unlike Ursula and
 
Gerald's "night of unbroken sleep," Gerald slept "the sleep
 
of complete exhaustion," while "Gudrun lay wide awake,
 
destroyed into perfect consciousness. She lay wide awake,
 
destroyed into perfect consciousness" (345).
 
The narrator's description of Gerald and Gudrun
 
certainly reflects Lawrence's argument in the preceding
 
Fantasia excerpt that "a false coition" brings
 
disintegration and that "[sex] passion as a goal itself"
 
leads to "humiliation and sterility." This destructive
 
outcome is reiterated further in other parts of Fantasia:
 
"The passions or desires which are thought born are deadly"
 
(85); "It is all will, the fatal love-will . . . only
 
deadly exaggerated volition" (80, Lawrence's emphasis). For
 
Ursula and Birkin, the narrator recites a litany of positive
 
descriptions in "Excurse" that reinforce Fantasia's refrains
 
of renewal: "new, fresh, tingling with newness," "changed
 
and renewed, refreshed, almost re-created."
 
In addition to examining parallels between WIL and the
 
essays—how WIL's narration and dialogue reflect Lawrence's
 
earlier conceptual stages of his unconcscious and union
 
theory—it is also important to examine the rhetorical
 
parallels between Lawrence's fiction and non-fiction as well
 
as between the two essays.
 
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, written a few
 
months before Fantasia of the Unconscious, is a more
 
straightforward expository statement than the later
 
Fantasia. In Psychoanalysis, Lawrence's goal is to expose
 
what he considers the evils of Freudian psychoanalysis and
 
its oedipal argument. He also wants to replace these
 
Freudian tenets with his own theory of the unconscious. As
 
in his fiction, his goal is moral: to reveal "the moral
 
dilemma of psychoanalysis" and to help "us" readers "recover
 
our moral footing" via his gospel of the unconscious and
 
union10 (Psychoanalysis 205 & 209). His text is diagnostic
 
and prescriptive—he analyzes the problems and proposes the
 
solutions-—and he assumes an assertive didactic posture,
 
much as Birkin does when he proclaims his ideas and much as
 
WIL's narrator does when he makes didactic pronouncements.
 
Nevertheless, after the poor reception that
 
Psychoanalysis received, Lawrence found it necessary to
 
expand his original treatise and to elaborate extensively
 
his ideas on the unconscious, quadrupling its length in his
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second essay, Fantasia. Fantasia then becomes a pseudo­
scidntific tract in which Lawrence systematizes his theories
 
and attempts to create a science of body centers (lightly
 
discussed in the first ess^y)^s a means of conhection
 
between the individual and the external universe, in
 
particular between the individual and others. More
 
important, in Psychoanalysis Lawrence simply "has the
 
answers," whereas in Fantasia he moves beyond his basic
 
theory of the unconscious by exploring the implications of
 
his theory for life's many relationships—education, child
 
rearing, marriage, gender roles, cosmology, sleep and
 
dreams—all to further illustrate and make more convincing
 
his theory of human development.
 
In spite of his efforts, Lawrence tells nothing new
 
about unconscious development and union in this second
 
essay. Most of Fantasia's additions are simply expansions
 
of the theory already established in Psychoanalysis,
 
expansions that do not add significant new information to
 
the core of Lawrence's theory, and expansions that sometimes
 
become digressions. However, reading Fantasia reveals
 
more than merely an expansion of Psychoanalysis. A
 
rhetorical examination of these two essays reveals striking
 
differences between them, differences that further clarify
 
Lawrence's role as author of the psychology essays and of
 
The significant difference between the two essays is
 
...V .-TV 5 • ^ a::;-; ^ ^ a;'
 
found not so much in their content as in their style and
 
structure. Lawrence does not say different things in both
 
essays; he says the same things differently in each. It is
 
not the "what" of these essays, but the "how" that affects
 
the reader. Lawrence creates a significantly different
 
persona in Fantasia than in Psychoanalysis. By Fantasia,
 
the writer's voice and the tone of the text have altered
 
considerably. According to Evelyn J. Hinz in her article on
 
the psychology essays, the differences in style and
 
structure are so significant that "not only must Fantasia be
 
viewed as a new statement rather than as a re-statement but
 
also that it must be viewed as a different kind of work from
 
Psychoanalysis" (252, Hinz's emphasis). She describes the
 
change from the first essay to the second as a movement from
 
"an empirical" to "a poetic methodology," from "an analytic"
 
to "an archetypal approach to the unconscious" (252).
 
Another assessment of the two essays can be found in D.
 
H. Lawrence's Non-fiction. David Ellis agrees that "[it] is
 
important not to lump the two psychology books together:
 
they do have a different character," yet he claims "the link
 
with the earlier [essay] is nevertheless maintained. In
 
matters other than scope. Fantasia is much less of a
 
departure than it tends at first to seem"^^ (83-84). He
 
further explains that after the unfavorable reception
 
received by the first essay. Psychoanalysis, Lawrence wrote
 
in a different style and voice in the second essay,
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Fantasia: "Patronizing yet defensive." This change in
 
persona evolved as a result of Lawrence's "unease about his
 
readership" (72).
 
In this second essay Lawrence is much more verbose, yet
 
unsure of himself much like Birkin "the word-bag" of WIL.
 
Lawrence's persona shifts from the authoritative
 
spokesperson in Psychoanalysis to the more defensive, self-

conscious speaker in Fantasia. Indeed a tentativeness
 
plagues this text. This is the most significant
 
characteristic of the second essay. Often when making an
 
assertion, Lawrence will qualify his statement, undercut it,
 
and when he does this, he appears to be second guessing
 
himself. At these times Lawrence's response is much like
 
Birkin's when Ursula pushes him to prove himself further in
 
their dialogues (see above, pp. 21-23). By contrast in
 
Psychoanalysis, where Lawrence completes the explorations
 
that he began in WIL, he unhesitatingly develops a
 
comprehensive statement of his theory of the unconscious and
 
union. There is no questioning of or experimenting with
 
ideas in this essay as Lawrence had done in the novel. Both
 
the unconscious and union with the other are defined and
 
articulated in a straightforward, declarative fashion.
 
First Lawrence speaks in the third person to elaborate,
 
explain, and educate readers regarding his theories. Then
 
Lawrence uses the first person "we" to instruct the reader,
 
as well as to suggest an affinity with the reader. This
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strategy is reminiscent of WIL's narrator who assumes the
 
same posture when speaking in the first person plural,
 
specifically in the "Man to Man" and "Sunday Evening"
 
chapters (see above, pp. 38-39, 45-46)
 
Also important is the tone. Embodied in Psychoanalysis
 
is the voice of a confident advocate who is convinced of the
 
value of realizing one's "pristine unconscious" through
 
"union with another." Lawrence is at home with his ideas,
 
convinced of their worth, and eager to pass them on to a
 
world he, like Birkin and the narrator of WIL, finds weary
 
of isolation and mechanization.
 
Lawrence has already arrived at his conclusions by the
 
time he writes Psychoanalysis and is ready to declare them
 
without hesitation or questioning. He is making direct
 
affirmative statements, statements in which his "we" does
 
far more than presume alliance with his readers. By virtue
 
of his lack of hesitancy, he presumes consensus from his
 
readers.
 
Psychoanalysis has sprung many surprises on us,
 
performed more than one volte-face before our indignant
 
eyes. No sooner had we got used to the psychiatric
 
quack who vehemently demonstrated the serpent of sex
 
coiled round the root of all our actions, no sooner had
 
we begun to feel honestly uneasy about our lurking
 
complexes, than lo and behold the psychoanalytic
 
gentleman reappeared on the stage with a theory of pure
 
psychology. (201)
 
The essay's opening immediately asserts an a priori argument
 
assuming a community of believers. Lawrence creates this
 
illusion at once, integrating his "we's" and his "our's"
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 with his third person indictment against psyGhoanalysis as
 
though he were truly partaking in a dialogue with others who
 
share similar beliefs. But Lawrence is the only one
 
speaking, and there is no dialogue occurring between
 
Lawrence and any other.
 
Four paragraphs later in this first chapter,
 
"Psychoanalysis vs Morality," Lawrence forcefully states his
 
■case^ with^'no''hesitation-:. 
First and foremost the issue is a moral issue. 
It is not here a matter of reform, new moral values. 
: it is the life or death of all morality. The leaders 
among the psychoanalysts know what they have in hand. 
Probably most of their followers are ignorant, and 
therefore pseudo-innocent. But it all amounts to the 
same thing. Psychoanalysis is out, under a 
therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the 
moral faculty in man. Let us fling the challenge and 
then we can take sides in all fairness. (202) 
Out of the eight sentences in the preceding citation, 
seven are third person statements outlining the sorry state 
of psychoanalysis; these seven are then highlighted by the 
paragraph's closing sentence, a challenge addressed to the 
reader in the first person plural voice. First Lawrence 
cleverly states his case in the third person as if it were 
simple fact, then personally engages readers to act on this 
indisputed fact with his first person plural voice in the 
last sentence This same pattern can be seen interacting 
among the opening paragraphs of the essay as well: 
Lawrence's effective blend of his third person voice that 
instructs authoritatively with his first person plural voice 
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that presumes allegiance from his readership.
 
Further illustration of this pattern is exemplified in
 
a six paragraph sequence beginning with the paragraph cited
 
above. The second paragraph that follows also opens in the
 
third person: "The psychoanalytic leaders know what they
 
are about," and the paragraph continues with more third
 
person indictments against psychoanalysis, also asserted as
 
established fact. Lawrence then feigris a receptive audience
 
by closing the paragraph with: "[We] hear the dull rumble
 
of the incipient avalanche" and"We are in for a debacle"
 
(202). These two third person paragraphs each close with a
 
"we" statement that presumes a connection between reader and
 
writer. A paragraph then follows that builds on this
 
connection by drawing the reader into the good fight through
 
its abundant use of the first person plural voice:
 
But at least let us know what we are in for. If
 
we are to rear a serpent against ourselves, let Us at
 
least refuse to nurse it in our temples or to call it
 
the cock of Aesculapius. It is time the white garb
 
of the therapeutic cant was stripped of the
 
psychoanalyst. And now that we feel the strange
 
crackling convulsion in our moral foundations, let us
 
at least look at the house which we are bringing down
 
over our heads so blithely. (202)
 
Standing alone the third paragraph serves to reinforce the
 
claims made in the two preceding third person paragraphs by
 
pulling the reader into the argument in the same way that
 
the indivdual closing "we" statements of each preceding
 
paragraph have created consensus for each pargraph's
 
individual argument.
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The fourth paragraph again pulls the reader to
 
Lawrence's view by Its opening first person plural
 
announcement: "Long ago we watched In frightened
 
anticipation when Freud set out" (202). Having designed an
 
artificial audience of participants through his deceptive
 
"we watched [Freud]," Lawrence then embarks on a rambling
 
two-paragraph myth about Freud, all In third person
 
statements presented as truth. The final sixth paragraph,
 
following LawrenceVs third person narrative on Freud,
 
reinforces the "we watched" theme In Its opening sentence:
 
"With dilated hearts we watched Freud. . . " (202-203).
 
Lawrence has purposely sequenced his pronouns both
 
within the Individual paragraphs as well as In the overall
 
arrangement of the six paragraphs collectively. From
 
Informing readers through seemingly established third person
 
statements of fact, Lawrence builds his argument by feigning
 
a dialogue between himself and readers, first through direct
 
address In the first person plural voice, and finally,
 
through his forceful use of "we" statements that have the
 
rhetorical power to draw readers Into moral certitude with
 
him.
 
Lawrence's narrator uses this same strategy of
 
Intermingling pronouns In the "Man to Man" and "Sunday
 
Evening" WIL chapters (see above, pp. 37-39, 45-46). In
 
each chapter, the narrator first presents Blrkln's and
 
Ursula's views respectively In third person statements that
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within the context of the narrative can be accepted by the
 
reader as the character's thoughts—as established fact.
 
From there the narrator launches into the persuasive "we"
 
voice presenting a philosophy that belongs to the narrator,
 
not to the characters. Here too the rhetorically effective
 
first person plural voice serves to create a pseudo-

connection between the reader and the text. The narrator
 
assumes a solitary didactic posture like Lawrence's in
 
Psychoanajysis, but there is no real audience as there is in
 
Fantasia where Lawrence is responding to critics' assessment
 
of Psychoanalysis (to be discussed later in this chapter) or
 
as there is in WIL where Birkin must respond to Ursula.
 
The interacting of these two voices continues
 
throughout Psychoanalysis. Again in his "we" voice,
 
Lawrence immediately rouses the reader at the beginning of
 
Chapter Two to find a new way, one better than Freudian
 
psychoanalysis has offered: "It is obvious we cannot
 
recover our moral footing until we can in some way determine
 
the true nature of the unconscious" (209, emphasis added).
 
Having established his imaginary community of moral
 
consentors in Chapter One, Lawrence is now setting up his
 
readers, getting them ready to accept his definition of the
 
unconscious, which will be another third person recitation.
 
Lawrence's definition of the unconscious serves as a base
 
from which his theory of union springs and, ultimately, the
 
union of Ursula and Birkin in WIL.
 
  
The word unconscious itself ie a mere definition by
 
negation and has no positive meaning. Freud no doubt
 
prefers it for this reason. He rejects subconscious
 
and preconscious, because both [terms] would imply a
 
sort of nascent consciousness, the shadowy
 
consciousness which precedes mental realization.
 
(209, Lawrence's emphases)
 
By this point, only eight lines into the second chapter of
 
his essay, Lawrence has set the stage for his definition of
 
the unconscious—the task at hand for chapter two and the
 
essence of the essay.
 
In the following three pages, he further sets the stage
 
by showing that Freud's unconscious is mentally derived,
 
thus "[the] incest motive is a logical deduction of human
 
reason" (210). After only three pages, and mostly through a
 
deceptively simple rhetorical technique, Lawrence has
 
established a captive audience, if not one ready to accept
 
his theory of the unconscious. He accomplishes this mainly
 
through the use of pronouns and by pronoun placement: on
 
the one hand by strong third person assertions and on the
 
other by insistent first person plural statements, always
 
directly addressing his readers while presenting his case.
 
And finally he states his case for the unconscious in full:
 
. . . We have actually to go back to bur own
 
unconscious. But not to the unconscious which is the
 
inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness. We
 
must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where
 
our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality.
 
The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of
 
any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It
 
is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the
 
spontaneous origin from which it behoves us to live.
 
(212) , ■ o:-;:;­
[intervening paragraph omitted]
 
. . . And where life begins the unconscious also
 
begins. But mark, the first naked unicellular
 
organism is an individual. It is a specific
 
individual, not a mathematical unit, like a unit of
 
force. (212-213)
 
Where the individual begins, life begins. The
 
two are inseparable, life and individuality. And
 
also, where the individual begins, the unconscious,
 
which is the specific life-motive, also begins
 
. . . (213, Lawrence's emphasis)
 
[two intervening paragraphs omitted]
 
. . . By the unconscious we wish to indicate
 
that essential unique nature of every individual
 
creature, which is, by its very nature, unanalysable,
 
undefinable, inconceivable. It cannot be conceived,
 
it can only be experienced in every single instance.
 
And being inconceivable, we will call it the
 
unconscious. As a matter of fact/ soul would be a
 
better word. By the unconscious we do mean soul.
 
But the word soul has been vitiated by the idealistic
 
use, until nowadays it means only that which a man
 
conceives himself to be. And that which a man
 
conceives himself to be is something far different
 
from his true unconscious. So we must relinquish the
 
idea [ideal] word soul. (214-215, Lawrence's
 
emphasis)
 
In three pages packed with continuous definition and
 
discussion of the necessity of returning to the unconscious
 
as the source of life, Lawrence has invited readers to
 
regain a Utopian state that will carry them through all of
 
life's experiences. Presumably, his audience is to be
 
captured by the rhetoric and swept up in the romantic notion
 
of returning to their very own selves, the true source of
 
life and knowledge. If Lawrence were simply using the
 
instructive third person, readers could not be drawn in
 
personally to his argument: his "we's" bid "us" to enter
 
his world of ideas/ to accept his salvation of the
 
unconscious, or at least to ponder it as a possibility in
 
"our" lives. Lawrence's rhetorical strategies are surely
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seductive/ at the leasl:, can tempt "us" into accepting
 
his "pristine unconscious," or rather, "our" "pristine
 
unconSGious..
 
By the time he writes the last chapter of the essay, he
 
can indulge himself/ and "us,'^ finally in a full third-

person pronouncement that summarizes his theory of the
 
• unconscious. ■ ■ ■ 
Thus it would seem that the term unconscious is only
 
another word for life. But life is a gehefai force,
 
whereas the unconscious is essentially single and
 
unigue in each individhal^ organism; it is the active/
 
self-evolving soul bringing forth its own incarnation
 
and self-manifestation. Which incarnation and self-

manifestation seems to be the whole goal of the
 
unconscious soul: the whole goal of life. Thus it is
 
that the unconscious brings forth not only
 
consciousness, but tissue and organs also. (242)
 
Also by Chapter Five's end (immediately preceding the
 
above citation), Lawrence•s full third person pronouncements
 
sum up his theory of union—body centers and all.
 
Thus the first plane of the upper consciousness
 
- the out-going, the sheer and unspeakable bliss of
 
the sense of union, communion, at-oneness with the
 
beloved - and then the complementary objective
 
realization of the beloved, the realization of that
 
which is apart, different. This realization is like
 
riches to the objective consciousness. It is, as it
 
were, the adding of another self to the own self,
 
through the mode of apprehension . . .
 
[two intervening paragraphs omitted]
 
The goal of life is the coming to perfection of
 
each single individual. This cannot take place
 
without the tremendous interchange of love from all
 
the four great poles of the first, basic field of
 
consciousness. There must be the twofold passionate
 
flux of sympathetic love, subjective-abdominal and
 
objective-devotional, both. And there must be the
 
twofold passional circuit of separatist realization,
 
the lower, vital self-realization, and the upper,
 
intense realization of the other, a realization which
 
includes a recognition of abysmal otherness . . .
 
 (239-241, Lawrence's emphasis)
 
It is important to note in the preGeding essay citations
 
that once Lawrence engages in an extended recitation of his
 
theories, he leaves the "we" address behind as he forges
 
into his earnest ayowal of life, of his theory.
 
Lawrence has created a specious audience in
 
Psychoanalysis, a specious "we." Like the narrator in WIL,
 
Lawrence is a solitary speaker in the first essay. In
 
Psychoanalysis--unlike the novel's dialogue where
 
characters, partiGularly Ursula and Birkin, are forced to
 
interact with one another and unlike Fantasia where Lawrence
 
is responding to the critics of Psychoanalysis—there is no
 
such "other" with whom Lawrence is engaging. In
 
Psychoanalysis Lawrence is proclaiming his beliefs
 
independently and creating an imaginary community of
 
believers into which he deceptively pulls the reader through
 
his use of"we."
 
Although he follows a similar strategy in WIL's
 
narration, the narrator's ideal claims can be more readily
 
questioned by the action of the novel, the real experience
 
of life. But in non-fiction, in Psychoanalysis
 
specifically, there is only theory, no experience. Here
 
Lawrence could finally outline his ideal theory without
 
interruption. At the same time Lawrence could make readers
 
a part of his "we" discussion, thus creating an illusion of
 
participation in a dialogue that does not in fact exist in
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this text. By the time Lawrence writes[Fantasia, there is
 
"another" to whom he responds, the critics of
 
More defensive and self-conscious in his posture,
 
hawrence seems to be struggling to prove himself in the
 
second essay, to justify his theory, a position he did not
 
assume in the first essay. In the process, he sounds
 
discomfited, and his uneasiness is reflected in the rhetoric
 
of Fantasia. In this second essay, a different voice can be
 
heard and a different tone experienced—one that is cynical,
 
even mocking. When forced to confront his claims, to
 
justify them for an unsympathetic audience, something
 
interesting happens to Lawrence. Uncomfortable, perhaps,
 
with his own seriousness and his own intensity, he does not
 
mock only those readers who cannot understand his theory,
 
but he mocks himself as well. In spite of his self-

conscious, defensive posture that can dislodge the reader,
 
Lawrence still makes his pronouns work for him in this
 
second essay, including his new "I" voice that enters the
 
text. :.V' \ '
 
The most radical change that occurs from Psychoanalysis
 
to Fantasia is Lawrence's overt use of the first person
 
singular and his blatant, often facetious, apostrophes.
 
Although he occasionally departs from "we" to "I" in
 
Psychoanalysis, one has to search extensively for the
 
pronominal shift from the inclusive "we" to the exclusive
 
 "I" in his first essay. But by Fantasia, the "I" screams
 
from the pages, betrayihgf a hyper self-ConsGious speaker in
 
^^^Lawience \
 
In spite of the first person singular intrusions,
 
Lawrence stiH retaiiis both his plural first person "we" and
 
his instructive third person from the first essay, but at
 
times they lose some of their persuasive power as they are
 
diluted by his personal entrance into the dialbgue. Later
 
in the essay they become secondary to his new, inflated "I
 
am I" persuasive strategy.
 
Nevertheless, the shift of "we" to "I" from
 
Psychoanalysis to Fantasia is significant. Lawrence's first
 
person singular voice in this second essay serves a
 
deliberate rhetorical function. Not only does Lawrence's
 
"I" stand out in the second essay, but it is present
 
immediately to the reader in Fantasia^s Foreword. Here
 
Lav/rence engages in direct dialogue with his readership and
 
direct confrontation with his critics. He begins his second
 
essay:
 
The present book is a continuation from
 
Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. The generality
 
of readers had better just leave it alone. The
 
generality of critics likewise. I really don't want
 
to convince anybody. It is quite in opposition to my
 
whole nature. I don't intend my books for the
 
generality of readers. I count it a mistake of our
 
mistaken democracy that every man who can read print
 
is allowed to believe that he can read all that is
 
printed. I count it a misfortune that serious books
 
are exposed in the public market, like slaves exposed
 
naked for sale. But there we are, since we live in
 
an age of mistaken democracy, we must go through with
 
; it. ■ ■ , . 
I warn the generality of readers, that this
 
present book will seem to theiri only ia rether more >
 
revolting mass of wordy nonsense than the last. I
 
would Warn the generality of critics to throw it in
 
the waste paper basket without more ado.
 
AS for the limited few, in whom one must
 
perforce find an answerer, I may as well say straight
 
off that I stick to the solar plexus. That statement
 
alone, I hope, will thin their numbers considerably.
 
Finally, to the remnants of a remainder, in
 
order to apologize for the sudden lurch into
 
cosmology, or cosmogony, in this book, I wish to say
 
that the whole thing hangs inevitably together. I am
 
not a scientist. I am an amateur of amateurs. As
 
one of my critics said, you either believe or you
 
dou't. (11) VV ­
Of the seventeen sentences that comprise the first four
 
paragraphs of Lawrence's Foreword, over half bear "I" as
 
their subject. Defensive, even facetious, Lawrence's voice
 
is forcibly asserted in this opening statement, and his "I"
 
is pronounced. It is clear that Lawrence is speaking, and
 
not a distanced representation of Lawrence.
 
In these opening paragraphs, Lawrence creates an
 
exclusive audience for himself through his "I" voice and
 
through direct address. Lawrence dismisses immediately "the
 
generality of readers" and "the generality of critics" in
 
his first sentences. Through these opening statements, in
 
his use of the first person singular, as a speaker in a
 
dialgoue with others, Lawrence becomes visible—something he
 
did not do in the first essay.
 
By virtue of his "I" statements that reject the
 
majority of readers as his audience, Lawrence is cleverly
 
creating another imaginary audience for this essay. He is
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 defining an exclusive, elitist audience—the chosen few
 
readers who capable of understanding his ittessage. To
 
make membership in this select group seem real, Lawrence
 
reverts back to the inclusionary "we" of Psychoanalysis in
 
the closing sentence of this essay's first paragraph,
 
enticing readers not only into membership but also into
 
agreement. The second paragraph reinforces the opening
 
paragraph's first sentences by reiterating his exclusion of
 
the majority, again through his direct address to the
 
"generality" of readers and critics.
 
. In Fantasia's two opening paragraphs, Lawrence's "I"
 
works in the same way that his third person did in the first
 
essay—to establish an a priori argument, in this case, the
 
existence of incapable readers. Both his direct address and
 
his "we's" then draw readers in, who, if they are to
 
consider themselves part of the chosen readership, must
 
therefore agree with Lawrence's premise. Again through
 
pronoun use and placement Lawrence can draw readers into his
 
audience and ultimately into agreement with his argument.
 
But in Fantasia Lawrence's "I's" make him the visible
 
speaker who takes responsibility for the assertions, whereas
 
in Psychoanalysis Lawrence hides behind his "we" assertions.
 
Although Lawrence becomes visible through his "I" voice
 
in this second essay, he also uses the first person singular
 
as a manipulative, rhetorical strategy that allows him not
 
only to win connection and consensus from the "few," but to
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 give his defense credibility against the critics who
 
rejected the first essay. Thus Lawrence's response at once
 
excludes and includes. Fantasia•s third and fourth
 
paragraphs' direct addresses, "the limited few" and "the
 
remnants of a remainder,,'' function iike t
 
Psychoanalysis. They establish connection between reader
 
and writer before Lawrence launches into his belief system
 
(several paragraphs) as a prelude to the essay itself.
 
Having drawn readers into his circle, he can now present his
 
views as established fact. As in the first essay, here
 
Lawrence's pronoun selection and direct addresses are
 
strategically placed within and among paragraphs in
 
persuasive progression in an attempt to win his readers'
 
consensus.
 
In spite of the profusion of "I" throughout this
 
"Foreword," Lawrence engages readers in the closing
 
peroration to his Foreword, abruptly shifting to a
 
predominant first person plural voice, then closing with the
 
third person and his solipsistic "I" in the very last
 
paragraph.
 
. . . Our vision, our belief, our metaphysic is
 
wearing woefully thin, and the art is wearing
 
absolutely threadbare. We have no future; neither
 
for our hopes nor our aims nor our art. It has all
 
gone grey and opaque.
 
We've got to rip the old veil of a vision
 
across, and find what the heart really believes in
 
after all: and what the heart really wants, for the
 
next future. And we've got to put it down in terms
 
of belief and of knowledge. And then go forward
 
again, to the fulfilment [sic] in life and art.
 
Rip the veil of the old vision across, and walk
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through the rent. And if I try to do this - well,
 
why not? If I try to write down what I see - why
 
not? If a publisher likes to print a book - all
 
right. Ahd if anybody wants to read it/ let him.
 
But why anybody should read one single word if he
 
doesh't want to, I don't see. Unless of course he is
 
a critic who needs tp scribble a dollar's worth of
 
words, no matter how. (15-16)
 
Lawrence effectively u^ the possessive third person,
 
plural in the firs^ paragraph to create further consensus
 
from his established audience. Not only does he summarize
 
his moral mission as an artist, but he makes his mission a
 
shared cause: "our vision," "our belief," "our metaphysic,"
 
"our hopes," "our aims," "our art." In the first paragraph,
 
Lawrence has designed a mutual cause that prepares the
 
reader for his call-to-arms, "we've got to," of the second
 
paragraph. Additionally, in this closing seguence to the
 
Foreword, Lawrence first establishes himself as a credible
 
speaker by making his moral concerns the reader's in order
 
to at once justify his facetious response to the critics in
 
the closing paragraph and to win consensus for the essay
 
that follows. In this example, Lawrence has cleverly used
 
his "we's" and "our's" to create an audience who will be
 
receptive to the second essay.
 
Ellis's explanation of the Foreword's origin is most
 
telling:
 
These hostile preliminaries become more
 
understandable when one discovers that they were once
 
not preliminary at all but the continuation of ^An
 
Answer to Some Critics' (Lawrence's initial sub-title
 
for his ^Foreword'), the first, major part of which
 
Seltzer declined to publish. In September 1921 he
 
had sent Lawrence a score of reviews of
 
PsychoanaJ^ysls and the Unconscionsf to which the
 
original waning of Fantasia is a relatively detailed
 
response! (72)
 
Hinz explains Lawrence's negative response to his readership
 
in another way:
 
negative appeal to a few fit readers can
 
be viewed as something more than a peevish reaction
 
to the critical fate of Psychoanalysis. (258)
 
But his argument is not that the majority cannot
 
read, i.e., are insensitive, but that the average man
 
should not read: the first is the typical defensive
 
complaint of the misunderstood writer, but the second
 
is a statement of principle. . .one of the central
 
themes of Fantasia. (258)
 
Considering Ellis's explanation of the critical
 
background that evoked such "hostile preliminaries" makes
 
Lawrence's design in creating a new audience all the more
 
noteworthy. In spite of his facetious tone and his blatant
 
presence in the dialogue of the Foreword, Lawrence was still
 
clever enough to evoke a sympathetic audience through what
 
Hinz defines as "a statement of principle." By arguing
 
"that the average man should not read," Lawrence invites
 
readers to join the elitist audience of capable readers and
 
he wins a constituency for himself in an effort to bridge
 
the chasm left by critics. In this way Lawrence can engage
 
himself more readily with his newly established, receptive
 
audience rather than directly addressing the critics'
 
concerns, thereby giving himself more latitude to expound
 
and justify his theory in the second essay.
 
In his article "D. H. Lawrence and the Fantasias of
 
Consciousness," John B. Vickery considers Lawrence's
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approach to his readership through a study of persuasion and
 
.^engagementr-'s/ A: f-; ^
 
The nervy dissonance of this sort of language is
 
clearly designed to galvanise the reader not only
 
into a state of alert attention and active
 
involvement but also into a process of individual
 
thoughtfulness rather than the customary thinking
 
based on habit and learned conceptual responses. At
 
first sight, it appears to be the antithesis of the
 
rhetoric of persuasion, but on closer inspection it
 
does carry its own kind of persuasiveness. (172)
 
This "nervy dissonance" characterizes not only the
 
foreword, but all of Fantasia, and Vickery's observation
 
applies more to the essay as a whole (especially the "I am
 
I" section to be discussed later) than to the Foreword
 
specifically. Yet Lawrence does create "alert attention,"
 
"active involvement," and "individual thoughtfulness" in the
 
Foreword by making readers a part of his "we," his unique
 
circle, thereby distinguishing his audience from the
 
"generality of readers" and the "generality of critics" that
 
his "I" shuns. The foreword thus serves as a rhetorical
 
prototype for the entire essay with its vacillation from
 
"we" to "I," its intermittent defensive, mocking tone, and
 
its sometimes biting direct-address.
 
Finally in Chapter Three Lawrence's use of "I" takes on
 
a magnitude beyond the "I" of the preceding thirty-three
 
pages—one that is sure to engage readers and one that
 
buttresses his theory of the unconscious presented in his
 
first essay.
 
At this point in Fantasia, readers can join Ursula by
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saying, "[And] you go all this way round to [tell me]"
 
; (148), because it is here, after all of Lawrence's lengthy
 
preliminaries, that the core of his theory of the
 
uncoiisgious is expressed, but in a way far different from
 
the 	previous essay. Here Lawrence engages the first person
 
singular in a sobering and persuasive style to capture "our"
 
attention, as he eloguently pleads his case for the
 
existence of the pre-mental unconscious state within each of
 
The solar plexus, the greatest and most
 
;	 important centre of our dynamic consciousness, is a
 
sympathetic centre. At this main centre of our first
 
mind we know as we can never mentally know.
 
Primarily we know, each man, each living creature
 
knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without
 
guestion, that I am I. This root of all knowledge
 
and being is established in the solar plexus; it is
 
;	 dynamic, pre-mental knowledge, such as cannot be
 
transferred into thought. Do not ask me to transfer
 
the pre-mental dynamic knowledge into thought. It
 
cannot be done. The knowledge that I am I can never
 
be thought: only known. (34, Lawrence's emphasis)
 
In spite of his third person syntax dealing with the
 
solar 	plexus and fusion, Lawrence personalizes the ,
 
unconscious with his "J am J" statements and his "we" and
 
"our," more intimately involving the audience much as he has
 
done in the Foreword's closing. Through this inclusionary
 
tactic Lawrence not only creates agreement with his
 
audience, but he also diminishes the voices of
 
Psychoanalysis' critics by bringing his new audience to the
 
fore.
 
His strategy in the second essay makes his newly
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created audience more prominent, thus engaging readers more
 
directly and more persuasively than in the first essay.
 
Although his defintion of the unconscious in Psychoanalysis
 
also incorporates the first person plural with third person
 
explanations, there is more distance between Lawrence and
 
the reader (see above, pp. 83-84). Psychoanalysis^
 
invitation to the reader to "know" the unconscious does not
 
hold the same certainty for the reader as Fantasia^s
 
declaration does: "We must discover, if we can; the true
 
unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any
 
mentality" (Psychoanalysis 212). Here the reader is given
 
urgency, but not hope. By Fantasia Lawrence includes the
 
reader with himself in his intimate "knowing" of the
 
unconscious: "Primarily we know, each man, each living
 
creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily and without
 
guestion that I am I" (34, Lawrence's emphasis).
 
Not only does Lawrence include the reader in his
 
community of the ideal unconscious through his affirmative
 
"we know" in Fantasia versus his "[we] must discover, if we
 
can" in Psychoanalysis, but he ensures inclusion for his
 
readers through his "I am I" definition. Here his"I" takes
 
on a cosmic magnitude (Hinz 264), leaving behind Lawrence's
 
awkward and conspicuous "I" of the Foreword. Yet Lawrence
 
is still able to define in third person assertions his
 
criteria for the ideal unconscious—that it originates at
 
the solar plexus, that it is premental, and most important,
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that it "can never be thought: only known." in just one
 
paragraph Lawrence has accomplished a dual feat for Fantasia
 
by making his definition of the unconscious believable both
 
to and for the reader—all through effective use of his
 
inclusionary "we" and introduction of his "I am I"
 
The four paragraphs that follow further define the
 
unconscious and its relationship to the primary body
 
centers—the solar plexus and the lumbar ganglion—
 
completely in third person syntax (with one exception),
 
closing with repetitions of the engaging "I am I" in the
 
fourth paragraph. By initially creating consensus in his
 
first paragraph (cited above), Lawrence has created
 
receptivity to his third person defintion of the unconscious
 
in the four paragraphs that follow. Again not only is
 
pronoun choice key, but pronoun sequencing as well.
 
However, Lawrence has done far more than create
 
consensus in his very first paragraph, he has created union,
 
a union reminscent of WIL's star equilibrium. Lawrence's
 
"we's" at once create union between him and his readers,
 
while his "I am I" creates "the other" by signifying the
 
individual reader, separate from Lawrence the writer and
 
separate from his audience of other individual readers. By
 
the time Lawrence finishes his first paragraph defining the
 
unconscious, he has already implied his theory of union with
 
the other through his "we's" and "I am I," thus creating
 
affinity with readers as well as credibility for the second
 
part of his theory in the sixth paragraph of this series.
 
And as he moves from establishing the solar plexus as the
 
source of "our" own unconscious sslves/ "our" own
 
individuality in the first paragraphy he then establishes
 
"our" connection with Others, the second part of his theory,
 
union with the other in the sixth paragraph.
 
But at the lumbar ganglion, which is the centre
 
of separate identity, the knowledge is of a different
 
mode, though the term is the same. At the lumbar
 
ganglion I know that I am I, in distinction from a
 
whole universe, which is not as I am. This is the
 
first tremendous flash of knowledge of singleness and
 
separate identity. I am I, not because I am at one
 
with all the universe, but because I am other than
 
all the universe. It is my distinction from all the
 
rest of things which makes me myself. Because I am
 
set utterly apart and distinguished from all that is
 
the rest of the universe, therefore I am I. And this
 
root of our knowledge in separateness lies rooted all
 
the time in the lumbar ganglion. It is the second
 
term of our dynamic psychic existence. (35-36)
 
Although the sixth paragraph does not define union
 
directly or describe it in the experiential terms of
 
consummation that WIL does, neverthless the narrator's words
 
in "Excurse" come to mind—the narrator's "palpable
 
revelation of living otherness" that Birkin and Ursula
 
discover in their union (320). And some four pages later by
 
the end of Fantasia's Chapter Three, Lawrence summarizes his
 
theory as it relates to the sympathetic and voluntary
 
centers of the body, and as it relates to this theory of
 
union: "Between the dark, glowing first term of knowledge
 
at the solar plexus - I am I, all is one in me; and the
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first term of volitional knowledge: I am myself, and these
 
others are not as I am — there is a world of difference"
 
(40, Lawrence's emphasis).
 
In this "J am I" portion of Fantasia Ellis's argument,
 
that Lawrence uses the first person singular to demonstrate
 
"his belief in the importance of an instinctive noncerebral
 
relation with the outside world," becomes credible, but
 
certainly not in the preceding pages where his "I" is of an
 
altogether different character, "making the reader more
 
aware of Lawrence as an individual and a writer" (75).
 
There is indeed a stark contrast between the first
 
thirty-three pages of this essay and the ensuing third
 
chapter, evidenced by the intermittent use of "I" and "we"
 
throughout third person syntax in the first two chapters
 
versus insertion of the persuasive "I am I" in the third
 
chapter. Pronoun usage and order take on even more
 
significance here as they operate not only within and among
 
paragraphs, but also as they operate within and among
 
chapters. Lawrence's solipsistic application of the first
 
person singular in the first two chapters opposes a more
 
powerful and persuasive 'I' in Lawrence's third chapter—
 
what Hinz calls "the cosmic ^I'" (264). In this chapter
 
Lawrence boldy proclaims "J am I" as a universal call to all
 
of "us" readers to affirm "our" own individuality, "our" own
 
unconscious, "our" own "spontaneous being."
 
The end of Chapter Three provides powerful closure for
 
his theory and for this second essay, unlike his actual
 
closing chapter some 150 pages later which leaves the reader
 
suspended and unresolved. Essentially Lawrence's essay is
 
complete after these first 41 pages, and everything else
 
that follows becomes anti-climactic, adding nothing new to
 
his theory. To explore these expansions and digressions
 
following Chapter Three, which make up the bulk of
 
Lawrence's second text, is too ambitious a project for the
 
confines of this study, nor would such an exploration add
 
anything of consequence to the argument presented here.
 
While Lawrence has uttered nothing new in Fantasia, he 
has certainly argued for the case he presented in 
Psychoanalysis, albeit sometimes a disconcerting argument. 
In spite of these limitations, Lawrence has cleverly pled 
his case for realization of the unconscious through union by 
implementation of his rhetorically persuasive "I" in the 
second essay, Equally important, the beginnings of these ■ 
arguments can been traced to WIL where Birkin and the 
narrator begin Lawrence•s exploration of the unconscious and 
union theory. 
Although Lawrence was able to realize the "struggle for
 
verbal consciousness" that he had begun in WIL through his
 
formal statement of theory in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia,
 
rhetorical examination of the essays shows that Lawrence was
 
engaged in another kind of "struggle for verbal
 
consciousness" in these nonfiction texts This second
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struggle is one of creating audience and consensus.
 
First in Psychoanalysis Lawrence expounds his theories
 
but remains invisible to his audience. By avoiding the
 
first person singular voice, Lawrence never enters into
 
direct dialogue with his audience, and by making
 
authoritative third person assertions, he maintains this
 
distance. Further his deGeptive use of "we!" in the first
 
essay does not create authentic union with his readers, but
 
creates instead a pseudo union and a pseudo consensus.
 
Birkin behaves in a similar fashion in his dialogues
 
with Utsula. He expounds his theories as established fact,
 
more interested in gaining her agreement than in considering
 
her views. Although she probed him thrdughout their
 
discussions, an authentic exchangei does not occur between
 
them, as Birkin continually presses his view and maintains
 
his separateness from Ursula.
 
Lawrence behaves similarly in Psychoanalysis where he
 
expounds his theories in third person assertions apart from
 
his audience. Like Birkin, Lawrence is convinced of the
 
validity of his theories, seeking only consensus rather than
 
genuine dialogue. However, Lawrence does create an
 
imaginary union between himself and his readers and,
 
ultimately, a feigned consensus through his rhetorically
 
deceptive use of "we" in the first essay.
 
In his second essay Lawrence comes closer to achieving
 
authentic union with an audience as well as the possibility
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of genuine;consensils. He achieves this by entering into a
 
dialogue with his readers through his first person singular
 
vgice^ ^nd his assertions that carry the rhetorical
 
potential of uniting his readets with him and to his^ theory.
 
Although Lawrence is more conspicuous in his defensive,
 
mocking tone ih response to critics, his first person
 
singular ;engagement in Fantasia makes him a visible speaker'
 
who can be reckoned with, thus creating more authentic union
 
than in Psychoanalysis where Lawrence never becomes a live
 
voice with whom an audience can engage, but remains
 
invisible and distant. This didactic, distancing stance
 
often taken by Lawrence has given credence to the charge by
 
many that he wrote and thought from a solipsistic point of
 
^view.; .
 
Not directed to the essays specifically, but to
 
Lawrence as a nonfiction writer in general, Ellis and Mills
 
cite commentaries by Lawrence's contemporaries reflecting
 
this widely held position. Jessie Chambers made the charge
 
that "[as] an artist, when he is dealing with the immediate
 
and concrete, he is superb, but when he assays to be a
 
thinker I find him superficial and unconvincing, and quite
 
soon boring" (2, Chambers quoted in Ellis and Mills).
 
"[And] Rebecca West's pronouncement . . . that what he wrote
 
was true ^only of the universe within his own soul'"
 
reflects the "alleged solipsism" often countered against
 
Lawrence (3, West quoted in Ellis and Mills). Most biting
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is T. S. Eiiot's commonly quoted, smug indictment that
 
Lawrence had "an incapacity for what we ordinarily call
 
thinking"''^ (3, Eliot quoted in Ellis and Mills). In
 
contrast, F. R. Leavis has hailed Lawrence as a writer and
 
as a thinker in what he himself identifies as "a long battle
 
to win recognition for Lawrence, and to kill the currency of
 
the grosser misconceptions and prejudices." (Novelist,
 
intro., ix). ' ' "
 
Whether reviewing Lawrence's fiction or nonfiction, the
 
multitude of commentaries bear a common thread: they are
 
responding to Lawrence's ideas. And these ideas have evoked
 
opposing responses: "His detractors have accused him of
 
stupid emotionalism, obsession with sex, anti-

intellectualism; his supporters say he was truer to feeling
 
than reason can be, treated sex as a religious activity,
 
denied the mind its right to inhibit" (Miko 3). Critics
 
have responded to Lawrence's thoughts as either the mark of
 
a madman or the mark of a sheer genius, even a demigod.
 
F.R. Leavis has been the prototype for proponents of
 
Lawrencian thought, while T. S. Eliot has exemplified the
 
opposition. However, at either extreme and in between, most
 
critical response has evaluated Lawrence's views in and of
 
themselves rather than the ways in which he expresses them.
 
In addition such critical responses have privileged his
 
fiction over his nonfiction, only considering the latter as
 
a means of understanding the ideas that develop in his
 
narratives. Eliis^s coitimentaries cited in the introduction
 
to this study are worth considering again:
 
[Critics] have been happy enough to pillage both
 
psychology books for resounding summaries of
 
Lawrence's *beliefs' but, considering how much has
 
now been written on him, they have provided
 
comparatively little appraisal of their character or
 
worth and not much discussion of their relation to
 
his other writings.: (Ellis.
 
By moving beyond this limited view of Lawrence's
 
psychology essays, first by tracing the rhetorical
 
development of their ideas from WIL to the essays
 
themselves, thus establishing WIL as the primary site of
 
origin for the essays' ideas, and then by tracing the
 
rhetorical development within the essays themselves, as well
 
as the rhetorical progression that occurs from
 
Psychoanalysis to Fantasia, this study has examined the
 
rhetorical implications of the essays' strategical pronoun
 
selection and placement.
 
Ultimately, when examining these essays, to seize the
 
ideas expressed by Lawrence and to wrestle with them as his
 
rhetoric tempts readers to do is not enough. Only by
 
examining Lawrence's rhetoric and by moving beyond the ideas
 
themselves to an examination of their varying modes of
 
presentation, can we discover how his rhetoric evokes such
 
powerful and opposing responses from critics.
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Chapter Four
 
Artist - Thinker - Theorist
 
The purpose of this study has been twofold: (1) to
 
reverse the prevailing critical use of Lawrence's nonfiction
 
texts, specifically the psychdiogy essaysy^^^ a windows which
 
permit us to see into his fiction and (2) to dispute
 
Lawrence's ciaim in iFahtasia's foreword that his theory of
 
the unconscious and union evolved undeliberately and
 
separately from his fiction. Clearly WIL's dialogues,
 
narrative explication, structure, and diction show that
 
Lawrence was consciously and purposefully developing his
 
psychology theory in the novel. The novel does indeed
 
represent Lawrence's "struggle for verbal consciousness."
 
Examination of WIL's narration and dialogue has shown the
 
beginnings of a struggle in this novel that was to be fully
 
articulated later in Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
 
Lawrence's theories did not simply come "unwatched out of
 
[his] pen"; they were not simply "inferences made
 
afterwards, from the experience," from his fiction^^
 
(Fantasia 15).
 
Lawrence had developed his idea that an artist's
 
philosopy comes "unwatched out of [his] pen" long before
 
writing his foreword to Fantasia. In Studies in Classical
 
American Literature (both in the first version, written
 
while he was writing WIL, and in the final version.
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 completed at the same time he was completing the psychology
 
essays), Lawrence articulated his vision of authentic art:
 
But art-speech . . . is . . . the greatest
 
universal language . . . Art-speech is also a
 
language of pure symbols. But whereas the authorized
 
symbol stands always for a thought or an idea, some
 
mental concept, the art-symbol or art-term stands for
 
a pure experience, emotional and passional, spiritual
 
and perceptual, all at once. i . . Art-speech is a
 
use of symbols whiqh are jpulsations on the blood
 
. . . (The Symbolic Meaning 18-19, early version,
 
Lawrence's emphasis)
 
The essential function of art is moral. . . .
 
But a passionate, implicit morality, not
 
didactic. A morality which changes the blood, rather
 
than the mind. Changes the blood first. The mind
 
follows later, in the wake. (SCALTSO, later
 
version)
 
The artist usually sets out - or used to - to
 
point a moral and adorii a tale. The taie, however,
 
points the other way, as a rule. Two blankly
 
opposing morals, the artist's and the tale's. Wever
 
trust the artist. Trust the tale. The proper
 
function of a critic is to save the tale from the
 
artist who created it. (SCAL 8, later version,
 
emphasis added)
 
Lawrence's claim for a morality that changes the blood
 
first and the mind later represents his vision of art both
 
for the artist as well as for the critic-reader. First,
 
Lawrence believed that the morality of the novel would be
 
expressed through the artist, in spite of the artist's
 
didactic intentions. He believed that "art speech"—the
 
only medium of truth—never came from the artist, but from
 
the tale. Further, he believed that "art speech" had the
 
capacity to change the blood, not simply the mind, of the
 
reader, again in spite of the artist's didactic intentions.
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 However, by following Lawrence'sadmoniton to "never
 
trust the artist" but to "[trust] the tale," this
 
examination of WIL has shown that Lawrence's thebries 4^^
 
not come "unwatched out of [his} w^ he was writing
 
the novel, nor were his theories simply "inferences made
 
afterwards" in the essays. Instead it is noW clear that
 
Lawrence's theories were consciously articulated conceptions
 
that began to take form in WIL some time before the essays
 
were written. Lawrence's "mind":did not follow "later, in
 
the wake": Lawrence was actively and consciously developing
 
his theory while writing the novel. This study has been an
 
effort "to save the [theory] from the [tale]" rather than an
 
effort "to save the tale from the artist."
 
Any survey of Lawrence's writing, both his fiction and
 
nonfiction texts, clearly attests to Lawrence's
 
preoccupation with individual development through
 
relationships—with the human dilemma of realizing intimacy
 
with another while at the same time preserving one's
 
individuality. From his earliest writings, Lawrence
 
explores this conflict between the self and others. But now
 
it can be argued that it is not until WIL and the psychology
 
essays that he begins specifically and consciously to
 
examine this dilemma in theoretical terms.
 
N Before WIL Lawrence does explore relationships in his
 
narratives, but never before WIL does he so specifically
 
examine the reasons for failed relationships, nor does he
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attempt to propose a formula for a successful relationship.
 
In earlier narratives, Lawrence explores the problems of
 
relationships and the internal struggles of his characters
 
through narration and dialogue. However, these earlier
 
characters do not discuss their relationships amongst
 
themselves in an effort to define an ideal relationship as
 
Ursula and Birkin do, nor do the earlier narrators
 
articulate Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union as
 
WIL's narrator does. In Lawrence's earlier tales, enough is
 
offered via narration and dialogue to aid readers in
 
concluding why a particular relationship has failed, but
 
there are no claims made for a relationship based on
 
Lawrence's notion of "star-equilibrium." Nothing in the
 
earlier fiction begins to resemble a theory of the
 
unconscious and union as Lawrence theorizes in WIL or in
 
Psychoanalysis and Fantasia.
 
By the time he writes WIL, Lawrence has moved beyond a
 
novel of experience into a novel of exploration, wherein he
 
begins to formulate his ideas about individual development
 
via union with another. In WIL he offers a thoughtful
 
examination of relationships through his opposing couples:
 
Gerald and Gudrun's union represents the failure of an all-

consuming fusion that destroys individuality, whereas Ursula
 
and Birkin's union suggests a possible solution to the
 
dilemma—"star-equilibrium"—the maintaining of "pure
 
singleness" through union with the other. This purposeful
 
study of Gerald and GurdrunVs fa and Ursula
 
and Birkin|s potentially^ successful relationshijj represents
 
Lawrence's first attempt to theorize in his fiction.
 
Not only in his narratives did Lawrence explore the
 
conflict between individual development and relationships.
 
Lawrence was preoccupied with this paradox throughout his
 
writings, and these ideas began to emerge in his earlier
 
nonfiction texts, prior to WIL and prior to Psychoanalysis
 
and Fantasia.^^ Particularly noteworthy is Studies in
 
Classical American Literature in which Lawrence did more
 
than just assert his theory of art and review significant
 
American artists. In the earliest version of this study,
 
written at the same time he was writing WIL, kernels of
 
Lawrence's theory of the unconscious and union appear,
 
kernels that were to be more fully expressed later in WIL
 
and elucidated even further in the psychology essays.
 
Amin Arnold points out that, in addition to critiguing
 
American literature, Lawrence also attempted "to jot down
 
reflections about his solar-plexus-theories" (The Symbolic
 
Meaning 5-6). Lawrence began sketching out the unconscious
 
and union in the earliest version of SCAL: "Our knowing is
 
always secondary and subsequent to our being. . . ."
 
(Symbolic 26); "Our ultimate attainment is in ''beings"—
 
"pure reality lies . . . in the mystery of the perfect
 
unique self" (Symbolic 49, Lawrence's emphasis); "Love is
 
the mysterious force" that can lead to either "creative
 
conjunction" or "frictional disruption" (Symbolic 118); and
 
in "The Two Principles" (an essay that never appeared in
 
SCAL•s final 1923 version), such terms as "duality,"
 
"polarity," "blood consciousness," "otherness,"
 
"sympathetic" and "voluntary" appear (Symbolic 186-189).
 
Arnold explains Lawrence's approach in these early versions:
 
Lawrence had originally planned to write purely
 
literary essays which he would be able to use as
 
lectures in America. But, as always with Lawrence,
 
he had to write about the problems which occupied him
 
most at the moment. And what really was on his mind
 
in 1917-1918 was his "philosophy". [sic] (Symbolic
 
4-5) --V ^ 
 
These early musings emerge intermittently only in
 
relationship to a particular artist or a particular work
 
that Lawrence is reviewing. They are not central to
 
Lawrence•s discussion as they are in WIL and the psychology
 
essays. This contrast between SCAL, WIL and finally the
 
essays shows Lawrence's more deliberate and concerted effort
 
to shape his ideas into a theoretical framework through the
 
articulation of Birkin and the narrator in WIL and
 
eventually through his own voice in Psychoanalysis and
 
Fantasia.
 
In addition to reviewing Lawrence•s own texts for this
 
study, a survey of the critical canon has shown a preference
 
for considering Lawrence's fiction as the core of Lawrence's
 
ideas. The nonfiction texts, especially the psychology
 
essays, are generally given secondary status and mentioned
 
only in passing to explicate the meaning and significance of
 
his narratives.
 
On the other hand, critics such as Hinz, Ellis and
 
Mills, and Vickery have cohsidered the essays as artistic
 
expressions in and of themselves—especially as expressions
 
of Lawrence's art of persuasion. However, in these studies
 
the,essays are isolated. These critics take a narrow
 
approach to Lawrence's rhetorical style and structure by not
 
considering how the essays relate to the fiction. Other
 
studies, such as Diane Bonds' and Daniel Schneider's,
 
consider the essays from a particular point of view: Bonds
 
in her linguistic evaluation of the texts and Schneider in
 
his consideration of Lawrence's own psychology theories in
 
terms of the thinkers who influenced them.
 
Besides reversing the order usually taken by critics,
 
thus showing that Lawrence's WIL wa,s a prelude to
 
Psychoanalysis and Fantasia, this study has been an attempt
 
to create a marriage between earlier critics who used the
 
essays only as "a tissue of ideas" (Bonds 3) for the novels
 
and those later critics who viewed the ©ssays more
 
specifically as a separate prose genre, one in which the
 
linguistic signs of Lawrencian thought operate solely as a
 
means of rhetorical persuasion. While such studies have
 
value in and of themselves for particular aspects of
 
Lawrencian rhetoric, Lawrence's writing and his thoughts as
 
a whole are more complex than any one study can reveal. By
 
considering the theories of unconscious and union as well as
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their rhetorical expression, both in his fiction and his
 
nonfiction, the reader/critic can understand more clearly
 
the developing theory from one genre to the other and see
 
more clearly Lawrence's evolving dialogue within himself as
 
well as with his audience. It is never enough to explore
 
simply what Lawrence had to say, in order to agree or
 
disagree with him. It is instead part of the critical task
 
to examine how what-is—being-said has been said. Lawrence
 
was acutely conscious of how he presented his ideas—his
 
rhetoric, his voice, his tone, his style—and reader/critics
 
fail to acknowledge his craft as a writer if they do not
 
examine and appreciate how he presented his thoughts in
 
print.
 
The essays' poor contemporay reception and the limited
 
attention that subsequent scholars have given them
 
(considering them only as aids to comment on Lawrence's
 
fiction) reflect the prevailing preference for fiction as
 
the superior form of discourse. This condescending attitude
 
may also reveal these readers' uneasiness with Lawrence's
 
multiple voices in the essays, his often sarcastic attitude
 
towards his audience, and his esoteric, almost mythological
 
presentation of his ideas. Paradoxically, these are the
 
very components that make the essays worth studying. To
 
limit critical attention and give priority to the fiction
 
not only overlooks the richness of rhetorical play in these
 
nonfiction pieces, but moreover, overlooks their beginnings
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in the novel. The psychology essays are not afterthoughts
 
to the novels; they have evolved through time from their
 
beginnings in the fiction. Women in Love is the site where
 
Lawrence began consciously to formulate his theory of the
 
unconscious and union. In P/omen in Love Lawrence began his
 
"struggle for verbal consciousness" that would finally be
 
realized fully in Psychoanalysis arid Fantasia.
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 Notes
 
^ I have used -the Cambridge UP edition ot Women in Lov^^
 
for all quotations and have not altered, nor noted, the
 
alternate British spelling.
 
This is but one example in which Gerald and Gudrun's
 
dialogue foreshadows Gerald's impending doom and their
 
failed relationship as well as contrasting Ursula and
 
Birkin's dialogue--another way the reader can see how the
 
opposing couples illustrate and build Lawrence's theory.
 
Also see the "Water-Party" Chapter, p. 177 and the "Snow
 
Chapter, p. 408.
 
^ "The deadly action-reaction syndrome seems a
 
characteristic of Birkin's linguistic attempt to taboo the
 
word ^love• and start from scratch with a new concept and
 
word to replace it. . . . Language seems like . . . a cul­
de-sac out of which Birkin cannot escape in naming how he
 
wants to be beyond love, love remains the central principle"
 
(Ragussis 178).
 
^ To reinforce Birkin's inital statement of theory and
 
to extend the dialogue between Ursula and Birkin, Lawrence
 
uses the encounter between Birkin's Mino and a female stray
 
as a metaphor for Birkin and Ursula's relationship and
 
Lawrence's theory of human relationships.
 
The notion of conjunction and opposition are
 
expressed in WIL, first by Birkin's "two single equal stars
 
balanced in conjunction" (151) and then by the narrator's
 
description of Gerald and Gudrun: "He seemed to balance her
 
perfectly in opposition to himself" (329) and "their being
 
balanced in separation, in the boat" (177). Birkin's "in
 
conjunction" implies a union, whereas the narrator's "in
 
opposition" implies alienation, not equilibrium.
 
^ It is important to note that in "Man to Man" (as well
 
as elsewhere in the novel) Birkin also strives to define an
 
intimate relationship between man and man, specifically
 
between himself and Gerald Critch. However a full
 
discussion of Birkin's quest is not germane to this study
 
except to point out that the same criteria hold whether
 
Birkin (or Lawrence) is discussing a relationship between
 
male and female or between male and male. (Also see
 
prologue to WIL, Phoenix II.)
 
There is some irony at play here in Lawrence's sexual
 
rhetoric. In an effort to elevate the sexual encounter to a
 
spiritual plane, Lawrence uses phrases-—"comes out," a
 
"flower opened," "died a little death," "come to her," and
 
  
"his throw"— that do double duty as orgasmic references.
 
In Fantasia's ch. 3 and Psychoanalysis' ch. 4,
 
Lawrence extends his discussion of the body centers and
 
their roles through the mother and infant relationship, our
 
primary introduction into the world of relationships.
 
^ "When he makes love to Gudrun, however he does not
 
achieve connection with her. He uses her for his ^relief'
 
and becomes like a child *soothed and restored'. . . . For
 
[Gudrun] has not given herself up, and she can only envy and
 
feel jealous hatred for Gerald, given peace in childlike
 
unconsciousness" (Schneider 184-185).
 
10 In WIL's "Class-Room" Chapter, Birkin makes this
 
same contrast between the authentic unconscious (Lawrence's)
 
and Freud's mentally derived unconscious (considered to be
 
artificial by Lawrence): "There's the whole difference in
 
the world . . . between the actual sensual being, and the
 
vicious mental-deliberate profligacy our lot goes in for. .
 
. . You've got to learn not-to-be, before you can come into
 
being" (WIL 94).
 
11 • •
Within the essay itself Lawrence alludes perhaps
 
defensively to his own digressions, i.e., pp. 46 & 102.
 
The point made by both Hinz and Mills regarding the
 
chronology of the essays is significant and worth noting.
 
The placement of Fantasia before Psychoanalysis in one book
 
may be misleading to readers, since Psychoanalysis was
 
written before Fantasia. To note their difference, the
 
essays need to be read and considered in the order that
 
Lawrence actually wrote them.
 
Both essays are filled with examples of this
 
hedging, i.e. Fantasia, p. 20: In spite of his strong claim
 
that the unconscious begins at the moment of fusion,
 
Lawrence claims not to know where he comes from, repeatedly
 
claiming ignorance of his origin; and in Psychoanalysis, p.
 
212, after claiming that the "true unconscious" is the
 
"spontaneous life motive," Lawrence says that "life is
 
inconceivable"—it can't be defined.
 
Less obtrusive in Psychoanalysis is the distancing
 
indefinite pronoun "one" that WIL's narrator sometimes
 
intermingles with his "we" assertions. The indefinite "one"
 
is more conducive to non-fiction discourse than in WIL where
 
the "one" creates a distancing by the narrator and a
 
didactic tone that does not flow with the narrative
 
experience.
 
15 •
Ellis also explains that Lawrence borrowed phrases
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 from the reviews, parroting them in his "Foreword": "a
 
revplting mass of wordy nonsense" and "pollyanalytics," for
 
example (72 & 85).
 
^ L his esoteric ideas is
 
reflected in the "Pompadour" Chapter of WIL when Birkin's
 
iettets are mimicked and ridiguled by; others: "[Those] 
phrases are too absurdly wonderful. . . . they're nearly as 
good as Jesus" (383) and "He is a megalomaniac . . . it is a 
form of religious mania. He thinks he is the savior of man" 
(384). ::, ■ ./ ' 
"His fiction provided him, he said, with the living
 
data, the passional experience, from which his ^subjective
 
science' was deduced. But if he deduced his laws of
 
psychology from life, ^life' as it appears in his fiction is
 
seen always through the lens of these laws" (Schneider,
 
preface, p. x).
 
i.e., see The Study of Thomas Hardy and "The Crown"
 
written and completed during 1914-1915.
 
"[There] is an attitude of intellectual superiority
 
involved in presuming that Lawrence's interests and ideas
 
can be understood apart from his so-called 'eccentric habits
 
of language'" (Bonds 4).
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